Talk:Yalta Conference/Archive 1

I think maybe that some one should write about how the Yalta Conference lead to the start of the cold war, but I don't think that I am the one to do it, just a thought Frogprincess1312 06:33, 25 Jan 2004 (UTC)

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- pleas that were useless in any case as the Soviets firmly controlled Eastern Europe- it is a personal opinion and assumption, not a historical fact. Just look at "firmly controlled" Austria for reference.Halibutt 18:26, 21 Mar 2004 (UTC)

As long as the USSR had a military presence in Germany it needed a military presence in the neighbouring country (Poland) and in order to have a military presence in Poland it needed a friendly government in Poland. PMA 10:34, 27 Feb 2005 (UTC)

Defence of Yalta

I tried to rewrite this naive para ("failure was...in the Soviets' failure to keep their word. Roosevelt did not cede to Stalin the right to control Eastern Europe." - he didn't? So in other words, was Roosevelt naive and incompetent? and the phrase "Stalin made USSR a dictatorship" is simply wrong - USSR was a dicatatorsip long before Stalin) but ended with something rather POVed - if in the second direction, so I am pasting my rewritten para here, for your comments and improvement: "However, some argue that the failure was not in the Yalta Agreement, but in Western Allies belief that Stalin's dicatorship could be trusted. Neither Roosevelt nor Churchill did not cede - officialy - to Stalin the right to control Eastern Europe. The Yalta Agreement guaranteed free elections for Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia. However it is hard to comprehend how the Western Allies could have honestly believe Stalin's promise, given USSR past and present behaviour - the Katyn Massacre, its hostility to Polish government-in-exile and its persecution of Armia Krajowa members engaged in the Operation Tempest. The USSR intentions were clerly visible in the Trial of the Sixteen which took place near the same time as the Yalta conference. It was Stalin's treachery and ruthless ambition -- coupled with Western Allied leaders incompetence and desire for 'peace at all costs' -- that paved the way for the division of Europe and the allowed the Cold War. After 1945 the United States did not respond because they feared a third world war and because of (by 1949) a threat of nuclear war." --Piotr Konieczny aka Prokonsul Piotrus ^Talk 12:55, 11 May 2005 (UTC)

As KingTurtle asks, I will do as he asks and paste the updated version in the text - at least it contains no obvious errors. --Piotr Konieczny aka Prokonsul Piotrus ^Talk 12:55, 11 May 2005 (UTC)

19 June 2005:

I deleted this paragraph:

'The truth, as always, lies somewhere in between. Undoubtedly, Stalin's treachery and ruthless ambition — coupled with Western Allied leaders' realisation, when faced with a multi-million Red Army standing on Elbe, that there is little will in their electorates to wage a new war to push the Russians east of the Curzon line — that paved the way for the division of Europe and the Cold War.'

I did this for a number of reasons: 1) the second sentence is simply ungrammatical 2) 'The truth, as always, lies somewehere in between?' Does it? Perhaps someone wants to argue this point on a page to do with the philosophy of history - but why import broad statements like this into historical articles? 3)'Undoubtedly'? Is anything undoubted in history? 4)'treachery and ruthless ambition'. Without being an apologist for Stalin, again I just don't see the need to use this kind of language. (As an aside - I wonder are treachery and ambition really sins when it comes to high politics? You might look at Churchill's own career for someone who could have given Stalin a run for his money on these lines. Maybe saying a world leader is guilty of ambition or duplicity seems a bit like saying that dogs bark. But more importantly, how does it add anything useful to the analysis of an event like Yalta?) 5) other than that I didn't think the paragraph added much that wasn't already contained in the text above it. Apart from the 'treachery and ruthless ambition' theory, the only substantive new point was about electoral will - I moved this up into the para above.

I also altered the line 'Stalin had ambitions to spread communism to eastern Europe and beyond'. I think this is debatable. You migh argue that Stalin's motivation was to create a military buffer zone around Russia, rather than to pursue any ideological vision. It may then have been that 'spreading communism' was the best way to achieve a military objective - but the issues are complex. How far 'beyond' Stalin wanted to extend Soviet influence is also a massive question. I changed the line to 'Stalin had ambitions to spread Soviet control to eastern Europe,' which I think leaves these issues more or less untouched. The article on Foreign Relations of the Soviet Union - or perhaps the article on Stalin - might be a better place to go into these questions. Falco.

Dear Anon/Falco. Welcome to Wiki. I agree with your NPOVing of this paragraph, as you merged the only important sentence 'Western electorates would support a new war to push the Russians east of the Curzon line' into the prevoious one. Please register if you plan on doing more edits or discussion in the talk pages - it will make it easier for you to edit and us to recongnize it is you who is doing the edits. --Piotr Konieczny aka Prokonsul Piotrus ^Talk 15:33, 19 Jun 2005 (UTC)

Challenging the conventional wisdom on Yalta

The concluding paragraph of this article perpetuates a common misconception about the Yalta conference: "It was Stalin's treachery and ruthless ambition -- coupled with Western Allied leaders' incompetence and desire for 'peace at all costs' -- that paved the way for the division of Europe and the allowed the Cold War."

By the time of the Yalta conference in February, 1945, Soviet armies had already driven the Germans out of most of Poland, the Baltic countries, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Yugoslavia and the rest of eastern Europe. By that time, lead elements of a Soviet force of 215 divisions were already within 30 miles of Berlin.

If Roosevelt or Churchill had been more forceful in demanding free elections or a postwar Soviet withdrawal, Stalin would have had little incentive to agree. After all, the only alternative for Roosevelt and Churchill was a full-scale attack on the powerful Soviet armies after the German surrender, at a time when the Pacific war was still going full tilt and the atom bomb hadn't yet been tested. The Yalta agreement contained some pieties about "democratic elections" in the occupied countries, but Stalin's past history should've lowered expectations to zero. There was finally just one way to get Stalin's armies out of Poland and the rest of eastern Europe: an invasion.

Still Stalin did back down to DIPLOMATIC pressure in Greece, see Greek_Civil_War#Confrontation:_1944. We wouldn't know if he would back down from Central&Eastern Europe, as C&R didn't pressure him much...--Piotr Konieczny aka Prokonsul Piotrus ^Talk 10:41, 15 May 2005 (UTC)

Again I'd refer to the reality on the ground: British troops occupied much of Greece following the German withdrawal in 1944, resulting in immediate armed conflict between the British and much of the anti-Nazi (and pro-communist) resistance movement. Stalin chose not to intervene, consigning Greece to the postwar British sphere of influence. In fact, Stalin may have inferred from British actions in Greece that he had free rein to suppress the anti-Soviet resistance in eastern Europe (see Weinberg, cited below, at pp. 727, 803). M.J. O'Brien 23:30, 15 May 2005 (UTC)

Agreed, this doesn't explain why he didn't back off when he met Allies forces in other places - Germany, for example. I.e. whatever specific reasons forced him out of Greece, why didn't they apply to other places Soviet Red Army advanced to? --Piotr Konieczny aka Prokonsul Piotrus ^Talk 10:17, 16 May 2005 (UTC)

Except the Soviet armies never occupied Greece. The British simply moved in after the Germans, in response to the Soviet offensives in the Balkans, withdrew in the fall of 1944. If the Soviets had succeeded in occupying Greece, the result there might have been very different. M.J. O'Brien 09:57, 17 May 2005 (UTC)

Stalin faced a similar choice: either continue the war or accept the reality of Anglo-American domination of western Europe. The Yalta agreement left many issues unresolved, but it recognized the military realities that would exist at the end of the war.

The Yalta provisions about forced repatriation of Russian prisoners and emigres were indefensible. But this was the result of a British initiative earlier in the war, not FDR's folding to pressure from Stalin. This decision led to thousands of executions (though it must be said that many of the repatriated Russian prisoners had fought alongside the Nazis).

Rather than begin a new and politically-unacceptable war, Roosevelt, Stalin and Churchill had little choice but to accept the situation defined by their armies. Whatever its many flaws, it's absurd to compare Yalta, as George W. Bush did last week, to "Munich and the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact." It's also unfair to accuse Roosevelt and Churchill of "incompetence," given the limited choices facing them.

Why? You yourself said that new war was 'politically-unacceptable' - politics played an important role at Yalta - as they did during Munich ir M-R negotiations. All sides were tired, and Western Allies didn't want to fight Soviets, even if it meant some of their allies would be in fact defeated (i.e. occupied by Soviets). The UK and other allies went to war once to save Poland and stop Hitler. They didn't have the will to do so again against Stalin. Understandable from realpolitk view - but deplorable nonetheless from moral viewpoint. The invasion could proceed quickly (also this is alternative history speculation, always :>), as the war in Japan ended soon after capitualtion of Germany, and there was a good chance it wasn't needed - Stalin would have likely backed down if threatened with rain of nukes (he didn't know US had none at that time). What really puzzles me is not that they didn't launch an invasion - as I wrote, it is understandable - but why didn't they put more diplomatic pressure on Stalin, recognize the governments in exile, even go forward to bluff with some threats? Wasn't their allies freedom worth at least a good diplomatic effort? --Piotr Konieczny aka Prokonsul Piotrus ^Talk 10:41, 15 May 2005 (UTC)

The U.K. and France had a treaty obligation to defend Poland in 1939. Though both dutifully declared war on Hitler after the invasion, they were unable to intervene on behalf of their Polish allies. The result was the long "phony war" that continued for seven months and ended with the invasion of France. The western allies were certainly in no better position to intervene militarily in Poland in 1945 than they were in 1939.

How so?? I agree with the Phony War part (setting aside that they could have told to Polish government they were signing treaties they couldn't hold to...). But in 45 they had a large army in Europe, experienced and generally prepared to advance east, and the threat of nukes against any opposition. How can you call this 'no better positio'? --Piotr Konieczny aka Prokonsul Piotrus ^Talk 10:17, 16 May 2005 (UTC)

[See my response to Balcer below. M.J. O'Brien 09:57, 17 May 2005 (UTC)]

By the time of the Yalta conference, there's no convincing evidence that the U.S., the U.K. or the U.S.S.R. had "the will" to wage a second colossal war in central Europe. Even before the existing conflict ended, the British and French were far more focussed on recovering their lost colonies than on the future of eastern Europe.

True. My point exactly - this para deserves to be copied to main article. They might had the strenght, they certainly didn't have the will. --Piotr Konieczny aka Prokonsul Piotrus ^Talk 10:17, 16 May 2005 (UTC)

Perhaps more diplomatic pressure on Stalin would have produced more paper concessions, but he later showed little inclination to honor the commitments made at Yalta. Prior and subsequent events showed that Stalin would never have relinquished control of eastern Europe without direct military compulsion. Call it a concession to realpolitik, but the map of Europe would have looked the same in 1946 no matter what Churchill and Roosevelt did at Yalta. The presence of hundreds of divisions, from all sides, created a de facto political situation in Europe that negotiations were unlikely to alter.

Well, this is speculation. It might, it might have not, but the fact is it wasn't tried - and would this diplomatic pressure, ineffective as it might have been, cost anything? --Piotr Konieczny aka Prokonsul Piotrus ^Talk 10:17, 16 May 2005 (UTC)

Yes, this is speculation and no, more diplomatic pressure wouldn't have cost anything. I think this is a fair criticism of Roosevelt and Churchill at Yalta. M.J. O'Brien 09:57, 17 May 2005 (UTC)

As for the "rain of nukes," even a limited nuclear attack in eastern Europe would've produced untold thousands of civilian deaths, many from the lingering effects of radiation poisoning, and incalculable environmental damage. This prospect evokes the infamous quote from the Vietnam war: "We had to destroy the village in order to save it." Such a war would have been morally indefensible in the extreme. Even with a U.S. nuclear monopoly until 1949, an invasion of eastern Europe to enforce the Yalta agreements was never a serious military or political option. It's an open question whether Stalin would have responded to overt nuclear blackmail, but there's little evidence from his behavior that he was intimidated by the relatively small nuclear arsenal developed by the U.S. between 1945 and 1949. M.J. O'Brien 23:30, 15 May 2005 (UTC)

It didn't stop their usage in Japan - AFAIK the radiation dangers etc. were not known (much about) in 45. I am not saying I'd like to see my home nuked, just that it was a diplomatic card that was never played. Until 49, Allies had a powerful card that could have weakened Soviets - and never used it...--Piotr Konieczny aka Prokonsul Piotrus ^Talk 10:17, 16 May 2005 (UTC)

It's surprising that this "powerful card" wasn't used to advantage during the Berlin blockade by the Soviets from 1948-49. Truman apparently concluded that the American public would not support a war over access to Berlin. All in all, though, I still have to conclude that Stalin would not have yielded on eastern Europe in the face of military threats, intimidation or even ultimatums. The evidence shows that he was absolutely committed to consolidating his hold on most of the territories occupied by his armies at the close of the war. M.J. O'Brien 09:57, 17 May 2005 (UTC)

This charge against Roosevelt makes as much sense as the claim that Truman "lost" China in 1949. In both cases the military realities on the ground were simply acknowledged by all sides.

Sources: "A World at Arms" by Gerhard L. Weinberg (1994), pp. 802-09 and http://www.bartleby.com/67/2621.

M.J. O'Brien 23:30, 15 May 2005 (UTC)

The root of the bitterness which Eastern Europeans feel about Yalta is this: at Yalta the West has demonstrated that it considers them expendable. If in 1945 the Red Army had control of Paris or Rome and wanted to impose communist regimes there, I think it almost certain that Britain and USA would go to war with the Soviets over the issue. This is because France and Italy are countries considered "essential" to Western civilisation. But Poland was among "far away countries of which we know nothing" as Chamberlain has so eloquently put it. Balcer 17:24, 16 May 2005 (UTC)

This is a strong argument that can only be rebutted by a resort to "realpolitik." The invasion of France, the Low Countries and Germany itself had been very costly to the U.S. and the U.K., and the French had a limited ability in 1945 to provide military support for anti-Soviet offensives in the east. British reserves of manpower were exhausted and the U.S. had already begun to transfer troops, including the entire 1st Army, to the Pacific Theater even before the end of the European war (see Weinberg, cited above, p. 872). Above all, there was clearly no appetite, anywhere, for a military confrontation among the former allies.

There seems to be a myth about Yalta that goes something like this: if only Roosevelt, despite his illness, had demonstrated more will, more resolution, the postwar map of Europe would have been transformed and eastern Europe would have been spared the miseries of Stalinist rule. There's some truth to this criticism, which is a variant of the "great man" view of history. But the harsh realities, including the de facto zones of military occupation, placed serious constraints on the ability of Roosevelt and Churchill--as well as Stalin--to exact major diplomatic concessions.

Thirteen million Russian soldiers had died to defeat Germany and Stalin had ambitions to spread communism to eastern Europe and beyond. Despite its staggering losses, the Soviet Union was emerging from the war with a modern, mechanized army and air force that were only rivaled by the U.S. These circumstances made it very unlikely that Stalin would yield to even the most intense pressure from his allies at Yalta. M.J. O'Brien 09:57, 17 May 2005 (UTC)

Well said. This discussion definetly yielded several paras worth of direct copying into the article - I will do it when I have some time - or one of you will? --Piotr Konieczny aka Prokonsul Piotrus ^Talk 10:12, 17 May 2005 (UTC)

Done. --Piotr Konieczny aka Prokonsul Piotrus ^Talk 21:19, 20 May 2005 (UTC)

Alger Hiss

Somewhere in the text Alger Hiss being in attendance on Roosevelt's staff should be included. [1] Any ideas where?

POV

I had to literally hold my nose when I read this article, it reeks of POV

Constructive remarks are much more helpful. What needs to be improved and why? Halibutt 16:09, August 9, 2005 (UTC)

Don't you just love this...now, any bets wheter our dear anon refers to the pro-Soviet or pro-Western POV? Or perhaps some other... --Piotr Konieczny aka Prokonsul Piotrus ^Talk 16:14, 9 August 2005 (UTC)

Martian..? Halibutt