Talk:Sixteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution/Archive 4

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Early Interpretation

It is important to note that the taxing power granted to the federal government in Article 1 Section 8 (Clause 1) is limited twice (by Article 1 section 2 clause 3 and Article 1 section 9 clause 4) to allowing only the collection of indirect taxes within the States. The Supreme Court has ruled that to avoid having the 16th Amendment destroy this provision of the original Constitution, “income” in its Constitutional sense can only be that on which an indirect tax can be imposed.

“But it clearly results that the proposition and the contentions [of the litigants, that the 16th Amendment authorized an unapportioned direct tax], if acceded to, would cause one provision of the Constitution to destroy another; that is, they would result in bringing the provisions of the Amendment exempting a direct tax from apportionment into irreconcilable conflict with the general requirement that all direct taxes be apportioned. Moreover, the tax authorized by the Amendment, being direct, would not come under the rule of uniformity applicable under the Constitution to other than direct taxes, and thus it would come to pass that the result of the Amendment would be to authorize a particular direct tax not subject either to apportionment or to the rule of geographical uniformity, thus giving power to impose a different tax in one state or states than was levied in another state or states. This result, instead of simplifying the situation and making clear the limitations on the taxing power, which obviously the Amendment must have been intended to accomplish, would create radical and destructive changes in our constitutional system and multiply confusion.”—Brushaber v. Union Pacific Railroad, 240 U.S. 1, 12 (1916)

Therefore, the 16th Amendment is irrelevant to whether any particular tax is constitutional under Article 1, which is controlling. The two purposes of the 16th Amendment were to (1) restore the taxing power of Congress to its pre-Pollock levels, and (2) restrain the judiciary from making another Pollock-like ruling. The “income” that Congress could tax from the beginning has always been defined only as the gain (profit) derived from the exercise of a privilege. A human being supplying labor (work for hire) does not derive profit from the use of assets but rather receives necessaries from the use of resources. Nowhere are necessaries (requirements for sustaining life and the ability to work) defined as “income.” As stated in the case quoted above (Bowers v. Kerbaugh-Empire), “income” is corporate profit, which is gain derived from capital, from labor [selling the product made by the company’s workers], or both. Wages of the individual workers are not included in this definition, and they certainly were not addressed as such in the Corporation Excise Tax Act of 1909. Furthermore,

“The Sixteenth Amendment must be construed in connection with the taxing clauses of the original Constitution and the effect attributed to them before the amendment was adopted.”—Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189, 205 (1920)

Modern interpretation

Here, the Supreme Court unequivocally ruled that the 16th Amendment is irrelevant to the taxing ‘‘‘powers’’’ of Congress and that Article 1 controls its ‘‘‘reach’’’ (application), such that “income” can only be that on which Article 1 allows the federal government to lay and collect an indirect tax within the States.
However, many rulings of the Supreme Court (cf. Eisner v. Macomber, above) held that whatever claim one makes about the ingredients of “income,” it can only be that on which an indirect tax can be imposed. Glenshaw is off-point as to the receipt of wages by individuals since it involved monetary damages received by a corporation, and the “accessions to wealth” were the punitive portion of the award. This case involved neither individuals nor the wages they receive—it reiterated that income is profit derived from the wages paid to the workers, not the wages themselves, by quoting section 22(a) of the 1939 tax act, which states that gross income includes “. . . income [profit] derived from [those to whom] wages [are paid][.]” A case much later than Glenshaw Glass again shows that the Supreme Court is fully aware of the limitations of the 16th Amendment:

“The legislative history merely shows that the words "from whatever source derived" of the Sixteenth Amendment were not affirmatively intended to authorize Congress to tax state bond interest or to have any other effect on which incomes were subject to federal taxation, and that the sole purpose of the Sixteenth Amendment was to remove the apportionment requirement for whichever incomes were otherwise taxable. 45 Cong. Rec. 2245-2246 (1910); id., at 2539; see also Brushaber v. Union Pacific R. Co., 240 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1916).”—South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505, n. 13 (1988) (Emphasis added)

The “otherwise” in the decision above refers to the limitations in Article 1 which restrict the constitutional definition of “income” (or of any other federal tax imposed within the States) to be only that on which an indirect tax can be laid and collected. Therefore, “wages” in the colloquial sense can certainly be income, but not in the constitutional sense, because a tax on wages (money) is a direct tax on the ownership of property (since money is personal property), which is prohibited by Article 1. Moreover, Congress has not enacted an indirect tax (excise) on either the activity of working for hire (labor) or on the event of the transfer of property (money) from employer to employee, so neither the activity of working nor the event of paying wages is taxed. Thus, when arguing whether a particular tax is permitted under the Constitution, neither the 16th Amendment nor the name of the tax is relevant. Article 1 is the sole determinant.

Stay tuned. Yours, Famspear 18:53, 30 December 2006 (UTC)

OK, the removed text is so full of errors it's hard to know where to begin. Here goes.

The statement that the taxing power is limited "to allowing only the collection of indirect taxes within the States" is nonsensical. Nothing in the cited provisions says that Congress cannot validly impose, and the government cannot validly collect, direct taxes "within the states." Despite gazillions of attempts by tax protesters in Federal courts since the mid-1970s, every court considering this issue has rejected the tax protesters' argument.

Neither the Supreme Court nor any other Federal court has never ruled that "to avoid having the 16th Amendment destroy this provision of the original Constitution, 'income' in its Constitutional sense can only be that on which an indirect tax can be imposed." Please read the quoted language again.

The statement that "the 16th Amendment is irrelevant to whether any particular tax is constitutional under Article 1, which is controlling" is also legally nonsensical. Tax protesters have constantly claimed in court that under the Constitution as amended by the Sixteenth Amendment, the Congress does not have the power to lay and collect taxes on incomes from whatever source, without having to apportion the taxes among the states and without regard to any census or enumeration -- and every court that has decided the issue has ruled that Congress does have that power. Many of the court cases are listed in Wikipedia. Sorry, but both Article I and the Sixteenth Amendment are legally relevant on the issue of validity of Federal income taxes.

The statement: "The two purposes of the 16th Amendment were to (1) restore the taxing power of Congress to its pre-Pollock levels, and (2) restrain the judiciary from making another Pollock-like ruling" -- is basically correct! Please read the relevant articles on Pollock, Brushaber, and the Sixteenth Amendment.

The statement: "The 'income' that Congress could tax from the beginning has always been defined only as the gain (profit) derived from the exercise of a privilege" is absolutely false. Over and over, Federal courts since 1913 (the year of inception of the modern version of the Federal income tax system) have ruled that "income" for purposes of the Constitution (including but not limited to the Sixteenth Amendment) and the tax statutes includes compensation in any form for personal services such as wages or salaries, and that taxpayers are not entitled to any exclusion or exemption from income with respect to amounts received for labor merely because income from labor is somehow not a gain or profit.

The statement that a "human being supplying labor (work for hire) does not derive profit from the use of assets but rather receives necessaries from the use of resources" is legally incorrect as an argument attempting to claim that amounts received for labor are not items of income under the Constitution. The statement: "Nowhere are necessaries (requirements for sustaining life and the ability to work) defined as 'income'" is legally irrelevant, and no court has ever upheld an argument that wages, etc., are not income on that basis.

The statement that "many rulings of the Supreme Court (cf. Eisner v. Macomber, above) held that whatever claim one makes about the ingredients of 'income,' it can only be that on which an indirect tax can be imposed" is incorrect. No Federal court has ever ruled that income can only be that on which an indirect tax can be imposed.

The statement that "a tax on wages (money) is a direct tax on the ownership of property (since money is personal property), which is prohibited by Article 1" is simply false. Even in the Pollock case, the Court recognized that a tax on income from employment (wages, salary, etc.) is an excise (an indirect tax). No Federal court has ever ruled that a tax on wages is a direct tax on the ownership of property.

Further, nothing in Article I of the Constitution prohibits a direct tax on the ownership of property. Indeed, under Article I, Congress can validly impose a direct tax on the ownership of property if it so desires. (Since a tax on the ownership of property itself would be a direct tax but not an income tax, the rule of apportionment would apply, and the tax would have to be collected in a way so that it would be proportional among the states according to population -- but that's another matter.)

Regarding the statement that "Congress has not enacted an indirect tax (excise) on either the activity of working for hire (labor) or on the event of the transfer of property (money) from employer to employee, so neither the activity of working nor the event of paying wages is taxed" is false. See 26 U.S.C. § 61 and gazillions of court decisions interpreting that and other provisions. For a listing of some of the court decisions including rulings that the U.S. Federal income tax validly applies to labor, income from labor, wages, salaries, etc., etc., see Tax_protester_constitutional_arguments#Cases_where_wages_or_labor_ruled_taxable.

As stated in that article, the courts have consistently rejected arguments that "wages" or "labor" (whether denominated as "labor property" or not) cannot be taxed under the Internal Revenue Code. For example, see:

  • United States v. Connor, 898 F.2d 942, 90-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) paragr. 50,166 (3d Cir. 1990) (tax evasion conviction under 26 U.S.C. § 7201 affirmed by the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit; taxpayer’s argument -- that because of the Sixteenth Amendment, wages were not taxable -- was rejected by the Court; taxpayer’s argument that an income tax on wages is required to be apportioned by population also rejected);
  • Perkins v. Commissioner, 746 F.2d 1187, 84-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) paragr. 9898 (6th Cir. 1984) (26 U.S.C. § 61 ruled by the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit to be “in full accordance with Congressional authority under the Sixteenth Amendment to the Constitution to impose taxes on income without apportionment among the states”; taxpayer’s argument that wages paid for labor are non-taxable was rejected by the Court, and ruled frivolous);
  • White v. United States, 2005-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) paragr. 50,289 (6th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, ____ U.S. ____ (2005) (taxpayer’s argument that wages are not taxable was ruled frivolous by the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit; penalty -- imposed under 26 U.S.C. § 6702 for filing tax return with frivolous position -- was therefore proper);
  • Waters v. Commissioner, 764 F.2d 1389, 85-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) paragr. 9512 (11th Cir. 1985) (taxpayer’s argument that income taxation of wages is unconstitutional was rejected by the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit; taxpayer required to pay damages for filing frivolous suit).

See also the decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in United States v. Buras, 633 F.2d 1356, 81-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) paragr. 9126 (9th Cir. 1980), in which the taxpayer's theory -- that wages were not taxable because (1) "only profit or gain, such as that from the sale of a capital asset, constituted income subject to federal tax" and (2) "[w]ages could not constitute gain or profit because wages merely represent an equivalent exchange for one's labor" -- was rejected.

See also the decision of the United States Tax Court in Link v. Commissioner, CCH Dec. 56,565(M), T.C. Memo. 2006-146 (2006), where the taxpayer's argument -- that pension income is "labor property" and that when taxpayer receives his pension income from his former employer for whom he once performed services (or labor), any amount he receives in exchange for his labor is a nontaxable exchange of equal value -- was rejected.

Further, under the U.S. Federal tax laws, even if labor were considered "property" the gain or income from "labor property" would be defined as the excess of the amount realized (for example, the money received) by the taxpayer over the amount of the taxpayer's "adjusted basis" in the "property" (see 26 U.S.C. § 1001). Since the taxpayer can have only a zero "basis" amount in his or her own labor -- the personal living expenses incurred to generate labor being both non-capitalizable and, under 26 U.S.C. § 262, non-deductible -- the "gain" would thus be equal to the amount of compensation received by the taxpayer. Compare Carter v. Commissioner, 784 F.2d 1006, 86-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) paragr. 9279 (9th Cir. 1986), where the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit stated: "The assertion that proceeds received for personal services cannot be given a 'zero-basis for the purpose of the assessment of taxation,' is frivolous. This is a variation of the 'wages are not income' theme, which has been rejected repeatedly by this court."

Article I is not the "sole determinant" of validity of a Federal income tax. The Sixteenth Amendment is part of the Constitution; both Article I and the Sixteenth Amendment may apply in a particular case, depending on the issues raised by the parties in that case. The "name of the tax" (whatever that means) may or may not be relevant.

Again, for background, see Tax protester constitutional arguments.

Thus, the removed material is objectionable because (1) it is unverifiable (not properly sourced); (2) it is non-neutral POV; (3) it is original research; (4) it is, from a legal standpoint, blatantly incorrect. Yours, Famspear 20:38, 30 December 2006 (UTC)

Introduction to Adding Info

First, I need to apologize to the other editors of this page. I recently "discovered" the edit feature of Wikipedia without realizing that there is a protocol attached, and jumped in with both feet. I now know that this page is where ideas are supposed to be discussed first. I also observed that Famspear seems to have a lot of time to devote to this particular subject and seems to be the unofficial censor of research that does not conform to his view of the subject matter. Therefore, I'll try coming in the front door this time rather than going in the back door and get some “official” approval.

My research over the years has led me to conclude that the only criterion for whether a tax (any tax) is constitutional is the grants and limitations in Article 1. Since Article 1 is controlling, the 16th Amendment is irrelevant to either the taxing powers of Congress or to the constitutionality of any particular tax. This quote from Eisner v. Macomber pretty much says it all, although there are many more cases which say essentially the same thing. Eisner states that

“The Sixteenth Amendment must be construed in connection with the taxing clauses of the original Constitution and the effect attributed to them before the amendment was adopted.” (252 U.S. at 205)

Also, along with all the other gobbledegook in Brushaber (engineered that way by Justice White), probably the most telling statement that the 16th Amendment does not authorize a non-apportioned direct tax is this one:

“But it clearly results that the proposition and the contentions [of the litigants, that the 16th Amendment authorized an unapportioned direct tax], if acceded to, would cause one provision of the Constitution to destroy another; that is, they would result in bringing the provisions of the Amendment exempting a direct tax from apportionment into irreconcilable conflict with the general requirement that all direct taxes be apportioned. Moreover, the tax authorized by the Amendment, being direct, would not come under the rule of uniformity applicable under the Constitution to other than direct taxes, and thus it would come to pass that the result of the Amendment would be to authorize a particular direct tax not subject either to apportionment or to the rule of geographical uniformity, thus giving power to impose a different tax in one state or states than was levied in another state or states. This result, instead of simplifying the situation and making clear the limitations on the taxing power, which obviously the Amendment must have been intended to accomplish, would create radical and destructive changes in our constitutional system and multiply confusion.”—Brushaber v. Union Pacific Railroad, 240 U.S. 1, 12

If anyone has a contrary view that somehow Article 1 has lost its original vitality I would welcome discourse on the subject. If not, I would like to add the conclusion that Article 1 is controlling to the broader context of either the 16th Amendment page or the Tax Protestor page. I would also like to point out that the contrary decisions of the appellate courts are irrelevant and involve using the word "income" to attempt to attach significance to the name of a tax rather than concentrating only on its constitutional characteristics. I pretty much ignore the myriad of appellate court decisions, especially the abominally bad 1989 9th Circuit case "In Re Becraft," because the appellate courts exhibit confusion (probably intentional) and don't really follow either the Supreme Court or the Constitution itself. Besides, appellate decisions are only the law of the Circuit, and when the law of the Circuit is in opposition to the law of the land, the law of the Circuit must yield. Anyone? —Preceding unsigned comment added by Wixpositor (talk • contribs) on 30 Dec 2006.

Dear Wixpositor: Thanks for your comments. Be back later. Yours, Famspear 21:59, 30 December 2006 (UTC)

Dear Wixpositor: Regarding the statement that I seem to be "the unofficial censor of research that does not conform to [my] view of the subject matter" -- well, all Wikipedia editors are here to edit according to the rules of Verifiability, Non-neutral point of view, No original research, and so on. With respect to legal topics, conjecture by an editor about what the law is or should be is probably going to be considered "original research" and does violate the No Original Research rule.
In writing about legal texts in Wikipedia, I would argue that you would follow the rules of legal analysis with respect to court decisions. That means that you do not develop your own interpretation. That means you observe the legal concepts of Stare decisis, Ratio decidendi and Obiter dictum. For a given statement, you would cite authority. If it's Primary authority you would have to be clear whether the statement is a Ratio decidendi or, alternatively, nonbinding dicta. If it's Secondary authority, it should pass the Wikipedia rules for reliability. For example, statements about what the law actually is from Corpus Juris Secundum could be reliable, while statements from Irwin Schiff or some tax protester web site would not be.
Your quote from Eisner v. Macomber for example, that “The Sixteenth Amendment must be construed in connection with the taxing clauses of the original Constitution and the effect attributed to them before the amendment was adopted" is a legally correct statement, but is not a Ratio decidendi from that case, and we don't want to lead non-lawyer readers (which after all is most Wikipedia readers) to incorrectly assume otherwise.
These statements you made are pretty telling:
I pretty much ignore the myriad of appellate court decisions, especially the abominally bad 1989 9th Circuit case "In Re Becraft," because the appellate courts exhibit confusion (probably intentional) and don't really follow either the Supreme Court or the Constitution itself. Besides, appellate decisions are only the law of the Circuit, and when the law of the Circuit is in opposition to the law of the land, the law of the Circuit must yield.
If you are ignoring appellate court decisions because you believe those decisions exhibit "confusion" and you really believe that the appellate decisions "don't really follow either the Supreme Court or the Constitution itself" then in my opinion your reasoning and your analysis is going to be very flawed -- not just from a legal standpoint, but also from a Wikipedia rules and guidelines standpoint. We are not here to make our own personal judgments about what the law is or should be. You can find reliable (as that term is used in Wikipedia) secondary sources that argue that such and such a court in such and such a case ruled "incorrectly" -- and you can cite those secondary sources as making that argument. (I don't think you will find any such reliable sources for frivolous tax protester arguments, though.)
The statement that "the law of the Circuit is in opposition to the law of the land" -- if that is what you are saying about one or more Circuits -- is from a legal standpoint problematic. As every first year law student in the United States learns or should realize, under the U.S. legal system the law is what the court rules the law is. Again Stare decisis, Ratio decidendi, etc. Even a secondary source (such as a law professor) who writes an article contending that such and such a court was "wrong" in deciding a particular case a certain way is cognizant of the basic principle: the law is what the court rules the law is. To paraphrase Oliver Wendell Holmes: "The life of the law is not logic; it is experience."
Gotta go for now. To be continued. Yours, Famspear 22:35, 30 December 2006 (UTC)

Comment on Constitutional Amendments

I’m still trying to get the hang of where what goes and the tilde business. Sorry if I put things in the wrong place. I’m going to try it again. If someone moves this commentary please leave a note on my talk page as to where it went.

I would like to make a further comment about the comments by one bd2412 in June (below under “Materials deleted from article”) about amendments to the Constitution. He notes, for example, that the Seventeenth Amendment regarding the direct election of Senators comes into direct conflict with the original provision of the Constitution providing for State election of Senators. This conflict exists because the Seventeenth Amendment actually did alter (supersede) the original provision. However, the Sixteenth Amendment could not alter anything in Article 1 because the Sixteenth Amendment does not contain the term “direct tax” and Article 1 does not contain the term “income.” Therefore, the only possible connection between the two would have to be provided by the Supreme Court when interpreting how the new amendment would be applied. The Supreme Court did this in spades in Brushaber. The quote to which bd2412 derisively refers as being “pure idiocy on the part of its author” is from the Brushaber decision, and unequivocally holds that the Sixteenth Amendment does not allow an unapportioned direct tax. Repeating it in its entirety:

“But it clearly results that the proposition and the contentions [of the litigants, that the 16th Amendment authorized an unapportioned direct tax], if acceded to, would cause one provision of the Constitution to destroy another; that is, they would result in bringing the provisions of the Amendment exempting a direct tax from apportionment into irreconcilable conflict with the general requirement that all direct taxes be apportioned. Moreover, the tax authorized by the Amendment, being direct, would not come under the rule of uniformity applicable under the Constitution to other than direct taxes, and thus it would come to pass that the result of the Amendment would be to authorize a particular direct tax not subject either to apportionment or to the rule of geographical uniformity, thus giving power to impose a different tax in one state or states than was levied in another state or states. This result, instead of simplifying the situation and making clear the limitations on the taxing power, which obviously the Amendment must have been intended to accomplish, would create radical and destructive changes in our constitutional system and multiply confusion.”—Brushaber v. Union Pacific Railroad, 240 U.S. 1, 12 (1916)

The only “confusion” has been added by the Circuits. District and appellate court decisions to the contrary are merely the subjective opinions of overzealous judges, most of whom are dead by now, who have built on the previous errors of other overzealous judges, until all the Circuits are hopelessly enmeshed in Circuit law that bears no relationship to the holdings of the Supreme Court. So far the Supreme Court has turned a blind eye, possibly because the arguments it received were not framed in language that would have broad application. At any rate, the KISS principle applies here. The Supreme Court has ruled in several cases that Article 1 is controlling such that the Sixteenth Amendment is irrelevant as to whether any particular tax might be constitutional. Leaving the name of the tax out of the equation and examining only its effect on the one who is responsible for remitting its payment to the government will remove a huge amount of superfluous material from consideration, leaving only the Article 1 question: “Is this tax direct?” If so, it is prohibited. If not, it is allowed.Wixpositor 02:32, 31 December 2006 (UTC)

Read in its entirity, the Brushaber Court is agreeing with my assessment. The quote above is not the conclusion of the Court, but the Court's restatement of the argument which it is rejecting. The Court basically says, 'here's what the taxpayer is putting forth as a reason not to pay the tax owed', recites that argument, then says 'here's why it's wrong'. Or, as the Court more artfully says, after reciting the above proposition, "let us by a demonstration of the error of the fundamental proposition as to the significance of the Amendment dispel the confusion necessarily arising from the arguments deduced from it." bd2412 T 04:07, 31 December 2006 (UTC)

Further Comment on Conclusion Regarding Amendments

I repectfully disagree with your conslusion. The Court is talking about the beliefs of the litigants that the 16th Amendment authorizes a non-apportioned direct tax, and is reacting to their mistaken conclusion. Immediately above (p.11), the Court states:

"The various propositions [of the litigants] are so intermingled as to cause it to be difficult to classify them. We are of opinion, however that the confusion is not inherent, but rather arises from the[ir] conclusion that the 16th Amendment provides for a hitherto unknown power of taxation; that is, a power to levy an income tax which, although direct, should not be subject to the regulation of apportionment applicable to all other direct taxes. And the far-reaching effect of this erroneous assumption will be made clear by generalizing the many contentions advanced in argument to support it[.]"---Brushaber, supra.

Therefore, the Court held here, as it has done in other cases, that the 16th Amendment does not authorize such a tax and the income tax has always been an indirect tax, which is one imposed on the exercise of a privilege. cf. Stanton v. Baltic Mining:

"[B]y the previous ruling [Brushaber] it was settled that the provisions of the 16th Amendment conferred no new power of taxation, but simply prohibited the previous complete and plenary power of income taxation possessed by Congress from the beginning from being taken out of the category of indirect taxation to which it inherently belonged[.]" (243 U.S. at 112)

The 16th Amendment had two purposes, one short-term and the other long-term: The short term purpose was to again allow Congress to tax corporate profits, which it had always been able to do prior to Pollock. The long-term purpose was to restrain the judiciary, which had caused the problem in the first place. I still have not seen any Supreme Court case which holds that the 16th Amendment superseded Article 1 (1:2:3 and 1:4:9).Wixpositor 05:18, 31 December 2006 (UTC)


I also refer to a couple of other cases which pretty much cement the concept (at least for me) that the 16th Amendment is subordinate to the provisions of Article 1.

"The Sixteenth Amendment must be construed in connection with the taxing clauses of the original Constitution and the effect attributed to them before the amendment was adopted."---Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189, 205 (1920)

Although Eisner (again) involved corporations rather than individuals, the above holding is "tax-neutral;" that is, it says nothing about the income tax but instead is only about the amendment as an amendment (rather than being about its effects). While I'm at it, I might as well cover another statement in Eisner which (I believe) many misinterpret.

"As repeatedly held, this [amendment] did not extend the taxing power to new subjects, but merely removed the necessity which otherwise might exist for an apportionment among the states of taxes laid on income. (Citations omitted.) A proper regard for its genesis, as well as its very clear language, requires also that this amendment shall not be extended by loose construction, so as to repeal or modify, except as applied to income, those provisions of the Constitution that require an apportionment according to population for direct taxes upon property, real and personal. This limitation still has an appropriate and important function, and is not to be overridden by Congress or disregarded by the courts."---Eisner, supra, at 206.

The direct taxes spoken of here are what I call the "pseudo direct taxes" manufactured by Pollock. Those taxes too were indirect (taxes on rents derived from property), but the Court had labeled them as being direct and had upset Congress's apple cart. Eisner above does refer to these taxes as being direct, but only because of Pollock. They are not direct in the constitutional sense because they are taxes on a derivative of corporate activity (income in the constitutional sense being the profit on which Article 1 allows an indirect tax to be laid and collected). Another case on point popped up nearly 70 years later:

"The legislative history merely shows that the words "from whatever source derived" of the Sixteenth Amendment were not affirmatively intended to authorize Congress to tax state bond interest or to have any other effect on which incomes were subject to federal taxation, and that the sole purpose of the Sixteenth Amendment was to remove the apportionment requirement for whichever incomes were otherwise taxable. 45 Cong. Rec. 2245-2246 (1910); id., at 2539; see also Brushaber v. Union Pacific R. Co., 240 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1916)."---South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505, n.13 (1988) (Emphasis added)

Since the only two provisions of the Constitution addressing taxes are Article 1 and the 16th Amendment, the "otherwise" above can only refer to Article 1 and its limitations on collecting taxes within the States. Further evidence that the 16th Amendment is irrelevant to the taxing powers of Congress is a 1929 case which concisely defines the entire federal taxing scheme.

“The general power to ‘lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts, and excises’ conferred by article 1, 8, of the Constitution, and required by that section to be uniform throughout the United States, is limited by section 2 of the same article, which requires ‘direct’ taxes to be apportioned, and section 9, which provides that ‘no capitation, or other direct, tax shall be laid, unless in proportion to the census directed by the Constitution to be taken’. . . . [T]axes levied upon or collected from persons because of their general ownership of property may be taken to be direct, [while] a tax imposed upon a particular use of property or the exercise of a single power over property incidental to ownership, is an excise which need not be apportioned[.]”---Bromley v. McCaughn, 280 U.S. 124, 136 (1929) (Citations omitted)

Significantly, the 16th Amendment is not mentioned as being relevant to the taxing powers of Congress, and it is also settled that money is property. To me at least, the conclusions about what Congress cannot tax are obvious.

Sorry that I'm still getting the hang of things. I just found Famspear's comments to my earlier posts and will digest them at another time (it's now 3:15 A.M. USA Pacific time), leaving my comments above intact.Wixpositor 11:24, 31 December 2006 (UTC)

The 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals clarifies: "It did not take a constitutional amendment to entitle the United States to impose an income tax. Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. only held that a tax on the income derived from real or personal property was so close to a tax on that property that it could not be imposed without apportionment. The Sixteenth Amendment removed that barrier. Indeed, the requirement for apportionment is pretty strictly limited to taxes on real and personal property and capitation taxes." Penn Mutual Indemnity Co. v. C.I.R., 277 F.2d 16 (1960)
The court also said "It is not necessary to uphold the validity of the tax imposed by the United States that the tax itself bear an accurate label." Congress is free to name the tax whatever it desires. It is the subject of the tax, not the name of the tax that is important.
The United States Supreme Court in the Brushaber case said "Indeed, from another point of view, the Amendment demonstrates that no such purpose was intended, and on the contrary shows that it was drawn with the object of maintaining the limitations of the Constitution and harmonizing their operation." —Preceding unsigned comment added by 24.151.200.56 (talk) on 1 January 2007.

Dear fellow editors: Please stay tuned for more commentary on this topic. Yours, Famspear 19:34, 1 January 2007 (UTC)

Oh, gee, at the expense of appearing to rub it in, I would also point out that in the cited case above, Penn Mutual Indemnity Co. v. Commissioner, 277 F.2d 16, 60-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) paragr. 9389 (3d Cir. 1960), not only does the quoted language actually degrade Wixpositor's position -- especially the court's statement that "the requirement for apportionment is pretty strictly limited to taxes on real and personal property and capitation tax" -- but the court in that case upheld the constitutionality of the Federal income tax. So sorry. Yours, Famspear 20:05, 2 January 2007 (UTC)


For whatever it is worth given famspears determined efforts to not allow the real intent of the amendment nor the intentions of the framers, i will one more time request that the TRUTH be posted.

he should full well know that no court interpretation is relevant if it directly contradicts the framers intent. HE should also know full well that regardless of modifications to the meaning of a word, it can not be changed judicially to anything else. with that said, here is the intent of the framers, that is to say the 61st congress under William Taft.

The income tax seeks to reach the Unearned wealth of the country

If it is the determination of the so-called "business interests" in thsi country to maintain an enormous navy at the cost of hundreds of millions of dollars annually ,as well as an army, to protect and defend thier various business interests, I insist that this part of the wealth of the country ought to stand its proportionate share of taxation, and i know of no way to compel them to do it as justly and equitably as the income tax

When you tax a man on his income it is because his property is productive. He pays out of his abundance because he has got an abundance. If to pay his income tax is a misfortune, it is becuase he has the misfortune to have income upon which it is paid

I therefore reccommend to the congress that both houses by a two-thirds vote , shall propose an amendment to the Constitution conferring the power to levy an income tax upon the NATIONAL GOVERNMENT without apportionment among the states in proportion to population. President William H Taft.

I find little point is wasting my time posting the opinions of the judges of the day as Famspear is quite familiar with them already i think and knows full well that the intent was NOT to tax the working man as his pay is NOT considered income in the sense of the word at the relative time in history.

I am for the income tax in that is does not hurt one single hair on the working mans livelyhood.

IT is rather clear from the words of the congressmen and president and judges alike from the period that income didnot and does not include the pay of any working man, but instead refered to the meaning of the word as it was used in that time to mean returns from stocks,bonds,dividends, corporation income, etc.

He does or should well know that the 16th's wording

means income(profits,gains of business's) from whatever sources (stocks, bonds, dividends ect but NOT pay of the working man)

instead today it is impressed on the working man that his pay is income (which is false)

They were so concerned about this that they even gave credit for the first $5000 worth of said income and made it tax free, in so that the common man could aquire some degree of wealth.

Today the IRS completely ignores intent and actual meaning of the words and instead has substituted thier own impressed meaning upon the people.

They use the ignorance (lack of understanding of the meaning of the word under law) of the common man.

The frightening part to me is that lawyers and statesmen are completely obilivous to the actual meanings as well. i say this because if they do actually know and yet still maintain that taxation is legal upon the average man then they are guilty of fraud as well.

people depend on lawyers to know and understand the law and what is legal. when the lawyers are as clueless as the people they represent then of what use are they to men anymore.

All quotes above are directly from the 44th Congressional record, 61st congress, 3rd session.

The quote from tafts letter was read to the congress on july16, 1909 by the secretary and is available in any federal repository library and is designated Document No.98

Now i fully understand that none of this will actually ever make it to the main page for this subject and will most likely be weakly attacked as non factual. I know this because i have tried several other time to enter into an honest dissertation with said honest editors and they have to date refused to acknowledge the truth and hold instaed to what is taught to choldren as fact.

Thank you for your time famspear 69.245.136.69 00:20, 22 August 2007 (UTC)

Thanks, user IP69.245.136.69. My response would be that you are rehashing arguments already posted in Wikipedia -- especially references to the Taft quote. With all due respect, almost everything you wrote is incorrect.
Tax protesting is a scam and a self-delusion. Tax protester arguments are based on fundamental misunderstandings or deliberate falsehoods regarding the U.S. legal system. Much of what you find on tax protester web sites is blatant falsification, including false statements about what courts have ruled, false quotations, and so on. I've studied this stuff for years.
One problem for tax protesters is that their hilarious arguments have been shot down so many times that many of the courts won't even give the arguments the time of day any more. The more these arguments are litigated, the more the tax protesters just dig themselves deeper into the hole. As they say, the first step is to stop digging. Because tax protesting is by definition a delusion, it's difficult for many protesters to stop digging deeper. Famspear 01:18, 22 August 2007 (UTC)


I should probably apologize for the zealous nature of my post, but I am fairly well read on the subject of the time and I have complete copies of the letter obtained from the Federal repostitory as well as copies of many journals of the time

Is there something i posted that is nonfactual? It is all directly from certified government documents directly from a Federal Repostitory?

If i have misconstrued something perhaps you can clear it up for me. Because with out citing a string of cases i can tell you i have read almost every Supreme court case involving this issue amendment issue)up until around 1930 or so to gather an understanding of the way they looked at things. How they used the vernicular of the day. I did ask several times for you or some other person with factual knowledge to email me and discuss it if i recall. and i was quite civil about it.

And you do not see me arguing Brushaber because i am quite content with their opinion on it as it completely relates with the intent shown by the framers.

I do not argue the code as it is sound, although obviously deceptive in nature. I dont argue many of the "technical" oddities of it.

"It will be written for the instruction of those who come after us, that in the years 1933-40, the outstanding experiment of the North Americans in seeking to preserve a free political system by means of limitation and division, or decentralization of governmental authority, came to an end, and that a new cycle began in which they again found themselves the mere pawns and playthings of centralized power. And in the analysis of the failure, the impartial historian will not hesitate to ascribe to the loss of those qualities of character in the mass and in government, without which the constitutional paper forms are lifeless and vain." Sterling Edmunds,1940

It seemed only logical to start at the beginning of the arguement. the creators. I beleive sir that this is the reason the clasue was put in the original documents. ( you should understand that of which i speak.)

I would be interested in any opinions that you might cite (Supreme Court only, the federal courts dont know which way is up more often then not.) where this has been presented to the court either orally or by brief and been dismissed summarily.

Just a thought scavenged.

If the ability to tax a person 1% exists then so exists the ability to tax said person 100% and this is peonage/ slavery, which can not coexist with freedom.

Till then sir


good day 69.245.136.69 03:56, 22 August 2007 (UTC)

Wikipedia is not a forum to debate the constitutionality of the income tax, nor are we here to convince you of the validity of that tax. If you don't have anything constructive to say about the article, or to add to it, please take your questions & speeches somewhere else. — Mateo SA (talk | contribs) 04:13, 22 August 2007 (UTC)
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