Talk:No Gun Ri massacre/Archive 10

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Proposed edit 6

I propose that we change this:

Background

Hundreds of thousands of South Koreans fled south in mid-1950 after the North Korean army invaded. North Korean forces used the refugee crisis to infiltrate soldiers behind American lines to conduct guerilla operations.[1]: v 

The division of Japan's former Korean colony into two zones at the end of World War II led to years of border skirmishing between U.S.-allied South Korea and Soviet-allied North Korea. On June 25, 1950, the North Korean army invaded the south to try to reunify the peninsula, touching off a war that would draw in both the U.S. and Chinese militaries and end in a stalemate and armistice three years later.

The immediate U.S. response was to dispatch the 24th Infantry Division, which had been part of the occupation forces from Japan to fight alongside the South Korean army. These American troops were insufficiently trained, poorly equipped and often led by inexperienced officers. In particular, they lacked training in how to deal with war-displaced civilians.[1]: iv–v  In the two weeks after the Americans first arrived on July 5, 1950, the U.S. Army estimated that 380,000 South Korean civilians fled south, passing through U.S. and South Korean lines, as the defending forces reeled in retreat.[2]: 251 

North Korean snipers dressed in the white garments common among refugee groups being searched and interrogated by American and South Korean troops in early August of 1950.[1][page needed][nb 1]

With large gaps in their front lines and refugees fleeing the onrush of the North Korean advance, the Americans were sometimes attacked from behind, and reports spread that disguised North Korean soldiers were infiltrating south with refugee columns, a continuing concern throughout the war's first year.[1]: v 

A July 24, 1950, entry in the 1st Cavalry Division war diary described the predicament: “No one desired to shoot innocent people, but many of the innocent-looking refugees dressed in the traditional white clothes of the Koreans turned out to be North Korean soldiers”.[3]: 101 

During the Battle of Taejon later in mid-July, hundreds of North Korean soldiers, many dressed in white to disguise themselves as refugees, infiltrated behind the lines of the U.S. 24th Infantry Division and played a crucial role in the defeat of the 24th at Taejon. The battle resulted in the capture of Major General William Dean, the conflict's highest-ranking prisoner of war.[4] Two days before the incident at No Gun Ri, a company from the 8th U.S. Cavalry Regiment was reportedly attacked by North Korean irregulars who infiltrated a crowd of refugees west of Yongdong [5] with the KPA driving hundreds of refugees towards US positions to clear minefields.[6] On July 24, a man dressed in the traditional white peasant clothing accompanied by a seemingly pregnant woman were searched by members of the 8th Cavalry Regiment and the woman's "pregnancy" proved to be a small radio hidden under her clothes used to report American positions to KPA forces.[2]: 199 

Adding to this confusing situation, a July 23, 1950, Eighth United States Army intelligence report stated almost all refugees were searched over one 24-hour period on the main road and none was found carrying arms or uniforms.[7] But three days later, Maj. Gen. Hobart R. Gay, 1st Cavalry Division commander, told rear-echelon reporters he suspected most of the refugee movement towards the U.S. defensive positions were North Korean infiltrators.[8] It was on that day, July 26, that one of Gay's front-line units, the 2nd Battalion, 7th Cavalry Regiment,[nb 2] dug in near the village of No Gun Ri, was faced with an approaching throng of hundreds of refugees, mostly from the nearby villages of Chu Gok Ri and Im Ke Ri.

References

  1. ^ a b c d Office of the Inspector General, Department of the Army. No Gun Ri Review. Washington, D.C. January 2001
  2. ^ a b Appleman, Roy E. (1961). South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu (June–November 1950). Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army. Retrieved February 8, 2012.
  3. ^ Conway-Lanz, Sahr (2006). Collateral damage: Americans, noncombatant immunity, and atrocity after World War II. New York: Routledge. ISBN 0-415-97829-7.
  4. ^ Bill Sloan. "The Darkest Summer: Pusan and Inchon 1950: The Battles That Saved South Korea--and the Marines--from Extinction". Simon and Schuster, Nov 10, 2009. pg 72
  5. ^ Johnston, Richard J.H. (July 27, 1950). "Guile Big Weapon of North Koreans". The New York Times. p. 1.
  6. ^ Korea Institute of Military History. The Korean War: Volume 1. University of Nebraska Press. 2000
  7. ^ Eighth U.S. Army. July 23, 1950. Interrogation report. "North Korean methods of operation". Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2. Cited in Hanley, Charles J. (2012). "No Gun Ri: Official Narrative and Inconvenient Truths". Truth and Reconciliation in South Korea: Between the Present and Future of the Korean Wars. London and New York: Routledge. p. 74. ISBN 978-0-415-62241-7. {{cite book}}: Unknown parameter |editors= ignored (|editor= suggested) (help)
  8. ^ The Associated Press, American and British Task Force Supports Yank Retreat July 26, 1950.

And instead use this:

Background

Hundreds of thousands of South Koreans fled south in mid-1950 after the North Korean army invaded. Reports spread among U.S. troops that refugee columns harbored North Korean infiltrators.

The division of Japan's former Korean colony into two zones at the end of World War II led to years of border skirmishing between U.S.-allied South Korea and Soviet-allied North Korea. On June 25, 1950, the North Korean army invaded the south to try to reunify the peninsula, touching off a war that would draw in both the U.S. and Chinese militaries and end in a stalemate and armistice three years later.

The immediate U.S. response was to dispatch the 24th Infantry Division, and later the 25th Infantry Division and the 1st Cavalry Division, all part of the occupation forces in Japan, to fight alongside the South Korean army. These American troops were insufficiently trained, poorly equipped and often led by inexperienced officers. In particular, they lacked training in how to deal with war-displaced civilians.[1]: iv–v  In the two weeks after the Americans first arrived on July 5, 1950, the U.S. Army estimated that 380,000 South Korean civilians fled south, passing through U.S. and South Korean lines, as the defending forces reeled in retreat.[2]: 251 

North Korean snipers dressed in the white garments common among refugee groups being searched and interrogated by American and South Korean troops in early August 1950.[1][page needed][nb 3]

With sometimes miles-wide gaps in their front lines and refugees fleeing the onrush of the North Korean advance, the Americans were sometimes attacked from behind, and reports spread that disguised North Korean soldiers were infiltrating south with refugee columns.[1]: v 

A July 24, 1950, entry in the 1st Cavalry Division “war diary” described the predicament: “No one desired to shoot innocent people, but many of the innocent-looking refugees dressed in the traditional white clothes of the Koreans turned out to be North Korean soldiers”.[3]: 101 

Around this time, 8th Cavalry troops reportedly were attacked by North Korean irregulars who infiltrated a crowd of refugees west of the central South Korean town of Yongdong, 100 miles (160 km) south of Seoul.[4]The official Army history says a seemingly pregnant woman refugee was searched by 8th Cavalry Regiment troops and her "pregnancy" proved to be a small radio hidden under her clothes said to have been used to report American positions to enemy forces.[2]: 199 

At the same time, an intelligence report by the overall Korea command, the U.S. Eighth Army, stated almost all refugees were searched over one 24-hour period on the main road and none was found carrying arms or uniforms.[5] “Such incidents were less numerous than the gossipmongers believed,” Korean War historian Allan R. Millett would later conclude.[6]

But Maj. Gen. Hobart R. Gay, leading the 1st Cavalry Division in his first combat command, told rear-echelon reporters he suspected most refugees streaming down the roads were North Korean infiltrators.[7] Later archival research found orders went out from unit commands during this period to shoot approaching refugees.[8] Wrote a veteran American correspondent at the war front, “It is not a good time to be a Korean, for Yankees are shooting them all.”[9]. On the day Gay spoke with reporters, July 26, 1950, one of his front-line units, the 2nd Battalion, 7th Cavalry Regiment,[nb 4] dug in near the village of No Gun Ri, east of Yongdong, was faced with an approaching throng of hundreds of refugees, mostly from the nearby villages of Chu Gok Ri and Im Ke Ri.

References

  1. ^ a b c Office of the Inspector General, Department of the Army. No Gun Ri Review. Washington, D.C. January 2001
  2. ^ a b Appleman, Roy E. (1961). South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu (June–November 1950). Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army. Retrieved February 8, 2012.
  3. ^ Conway-Lanz, Sahr (2006). Collateral damage: Americans, noncombatant immunity, and atrocity after World War II. New York: Routledge. ISBN 0-415-97829-7.
  4. ^ Johnston, Richard J.H. (1950-07-27). "Guile Big Weapon of North Koreans". The New York Times. p. 1,3 (This report is not corroborated in the official Army history).
  5. ^ Eighth U.S. Army. July 23, 1950. Interrogation report. "North Korean methods of operation". Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2. Cited in Hanley, Charles J. (2012). "No Gun Ri: Official Narrative and Inconvenient Truths". Truth and Reconciliation in South Korea: Between the Present and Future of the Korean Wars. London and New York: Routledge. p. 74. ISBN 978-0-415-62241-7. {{cite book}}: Unknown parameter |editors= ignored (|editor= suggested) (help)
  6. ^ Millett, Allan R. (2010). The War for Korea, 1950-51. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas. p. 161. ISBN 9780700617098.
  7. ^ The Associated Press, American and British Task Force Supports Yank Retreat July 26, 1950.
  8. ^ "War's hidden chapter: Ex-GIs tell of killing Korean refugees". The Associated Press. 1999-09-29.
  9. ^ Keyes Beech, Newark, N.J., Star-Ledger, July 23, 1950, cited in Andersen, Robin (2006). A Century of Media, a Century of War. New York: Peter Lang. p. 38. ISBN 0820478946.

This edit restores some balance to this section and adds, in few words, some telling info. The rumors and fears of infiltration far outweighed the reality of the threat. The huge threat was from uniformed NK troops “infiltrating” through the gaps. (The official Army history uses that word to mean just that.)

Specifically:

  • Graf 2: Adding the two other divisions early to Korea, both figuring later in the article.
  • Graf 3: Noting the gaps in U.S. lines were sometimes miles wide. (Two 1st Cav battalions at Yongdong were seven miles apart.)
  • Graf 5: Footnote notes this supposed incident from a news report is not mentioned in the official Army history.
  • Graf 6: Millett, a leading KWar historian, puts things in perspective.
  • Last graf: The fact that this was Gay’s first combat command is important, I feel. (He was a staff officer in WWII ETO. In fact, the same could be said of every officer from Gay on down to battalion level at NGR, and of most of the company commanders.)
  • Last graf: Although the article’s lead discusses “kill” orders, it seemed to me this section should mention them. Otherwise, the reader goes on to read about the NGR killings in detail and has to wait until later sections to be reminded of the orders.
  • Last graf: Keyes Beech’s quote is not essential; in fact, I’m ambivalent about it. I don’t have the article, but it’s cited in several books. (He actually was Chicago Daily News, syndicated in the Star-Ledger.) The reader may wonder, well, well, tell us more, Mr. Beech.

Cjhanley (talk)

I appreciate your enthusiasm, and it may just be pedantry on my part, but you're going to have to break things up a bit. This is just speaking from experience: if we try to do this five paragraphs at a time, someone is going to take issue with points 3, 7, and 42 and the debate is going to quickly spiral into unproductivity. It's best if we take each edit one at a time in their own sections so that debate on one single point can remain in one single section.

It's not going to hurt anything if we get to proposed edit 407, and there's no rush to get everything done at once because there is no WP:DEADLINE. It also reduces the chance that an edit that actually doesn't have consensus slips through because people here simply missed it on account of trying to take in 14 edits at a time.

I realize you're taking my lead (not to mix words) on the proposed conglomerate lead section. But that was only after each individual edit was considered and discussed in vacuo. Timothyjosephwood (talk) 15:59, 5 June 2015 (UTC)

I hear what you're saying. But, on the other hand, the problem with taking it a graf at a time is that something may be done to graf 1 that hinges on something being done in graf 7. Editors will argue over 1 without seeing the full picture, including 7. In this case, there's currently overkill on supposed "infiltration" events, including a couple that are weakly sourced, so the edits reduce five such elements to three, while adding the very apropos quote from KWar historian Millett that these rumors were overblown. I believe editors need to see the full picture, and not start off by, for example, arguing over one weakly sourced element. The full picture shows nothing's lost by dropping it, and some balance is gained, along with considerable time.Cjhanley (talk) — Preceding undated comment added 16:43, 5 June 2015 (UTC)
That's not a problem because we can settle the first edit and when we get to the second edit we can say "Look back on edit 81 where we settled this issue. This is a purely pro forma proposal to extend the consensus to this other edit." Remember, this isn't just about addressing issues, this is also about establishing a record that issues were addressed, consensus was reached, and anyone who wants to change anything has to overcome this broad consensus, which isn't easy to do. Compare the literally hundreds of deletions of "but primarily affects women" at Sexism. Anyone who wants to change that and make it stick has to overcome about three pages of sources and consensus, which isn't easy to do. Trust me, I think the wording is itself sexist, and I've tried, as you can see on the talk page.
At the heart of it, when someone changes something ten years from now, they're not going to change five paragraphs at a time. They're going to change one eensy weensy point. So we need a record that we reached consensus on that eensy weensy point and that's that. This is how you establish longevity on an encyclopedia that anyone can edit. It's all about WP:CONSENSUS. This is a diplomatic negotiation. It isn't a situation where your editor can mark up your draft with a red pen and tell you to fix it. Timothyjosephwood (talk) 16:59, 5 June 2015 (UTC)
Then again, one could post an entire chunk -- "big picture" -- and then discuss and approve one graf at a time. At least one sees how graf 1 hangs with 7. Let me start today with Proposed edit 6A.

Proposed edit 6A

I propose that we change this:

Background

Hundreds of thousands of South Koreans fled south in mid-1950 after the North Korean army invaded. North Korean forces used the refugee crisis to infiltrate soldiers behind American lines to conduct guerilla operations.[1]: v 

The division of Japan's former Korean colony into two zones at the end of World War II led to years of border skirmishing between U.S.-allied South Korea and Soviet-allied North Korea. On June 25, 1950, the North Korean army invaded the south to try to reunify the peninsula, touching off a war that would draw in both the U.S. and Chinese militaries and end in a stalemate and armistice three years later.

The immediate U.S. response was to dispatch the 24th Infantry Division, which had been part of the occupation forces from Japan to fight alongside the South Korean army. These American troops were insufficiently trained, poorly equipped and often led by inexperienced officers. In particular, they lacked training in how to deal with war-displaced civilians.[1]: iv–v  In the two weeks after the Americans first arrived on July 5, 1950, the U.S. Army estimated that 380,000 South Korean civilians fled south, passing through U.S. and South Korean lines, as the defending forces reeled in retreat.[2]: 251 

References

  1. ^ a b Office of the Inspector General, Department of the Army. No Gun Ri Review. Washington, D.C. January 2001
  2. ^ Appleman, Roy E. (1961). South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu (June–November 1950). Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army. Retrieved February 8, 2012.

And instead use this:

Background

Huge numbers of South Koreans fled south in mid-1950 after the North Korean army invaded. By spring 1951, the U.S.-led U.N. Command estimated 5 million South and North Koreans had become refugees.”.[1]: 150–151  (U.S. Defense Department photo)

The division of Japan's former Korean colony into two zones at the end of World War II led to years of border skirmishing between U.S.-allied South Korea and Soviet-allied North Korea. On June 25, 1950, the North Korean army invaded the south to try to reunify the peninsula, touching off a war that would draw in both the U.S. and Chinese militaries and end in a stalemate and armistice three years later.

The immediate U.S. response was to dispatch the 24th Infantry Division, and later the 25th Infantry Division and the 1st Cavalry Division, all part of the occupation forces in Japan, to fight alongside the South Korean army. These American troops were insufficiently trained, poorly equipped and often led by inexperienced officers. In particular, they lacked training in how to deal with war-displaced civilians.[2]: iv–v  In the two weeks after the Americans first arrived on July 5, 1950, the U.S. Army estimated that 380,000 South Korean civilians fled south, passing through U.S. and South Korean lines, as the defending forces retreated.[3]: 251 

References

  1. ^ Conway-Lanz, Sahr (2006). Collateral damage: Americans, noncombatant immunity, and atrocity after World War II. New York: Routledge. ISBN 0-415-97829-7.
  2. ^ Office of the Inspector General, Department of the Army. No Gun Ri Review. Washington, D.C. January 2001
  3. ^ Appleman, Roy E. (1961). South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu (June–November 1950). Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army. Retrieved February 8, 2012.
  • This inserts the other early divisions, which otherwise are suddenly mentioned in the article without introduction.
  • Removes "reeled in" retreat.
  • On the photo caption: redundant info re infiltration removed, total number of refugees added, photo credited.

Charles J. Hanley 18:13, 5 June 2015 (UTC)

The inclusion of the role of North Korean infiltrators at the battle of Taejon was cited specifically in the Muccio letter when drafting the refugee policy. Hanley has always been eager to minimize reports of infiltration, even going so far to say "There was no “documented infiltration” among the refugees to be found in the records of front-line units in the time leading up to No Gun Ri". This as we know from the sources above is flat our wrong and more reflects Hanley's POV rather than what reliable secondary sources have stated. WeldNeck (talk) 18:44, 5 June 2015 (UTC)

Again, you do not need to establish that this is WP:TRUTH. You need to establish that it is WP:MAINSTREAM and not WP:FRINGE. You need to do this using secondary or tertiary sources. This is at least the third time I have said this. Also, you need to argue the sources, not what the other side thinks. I have said this more than I care to count. No one cares what either of you thinks. We care what sources you have. What part of that do you not understand? Timothyjosephwood (talk) 21:37, 7 June 2015 (UTC)
Further re the caption: I believe someone up above (Irondome?) suggested that linking the refugees in the picture to infiltrators is wrong. Perhaps it should just stand as a photo of 1950 refugees, and let the article text deal with the infiltration issue. Charles J. Hanley 18:59, 5 June 2015 (UTC)
This is fairly minor and uncontroversial. I agree that we should just keep the photo caption simple, we'll discuss the infiltration in the text. GeneralizationsAreBad (talk) 23:00, 5 June 2015 (UTC)
Done. Cjhanley (talk)
Great. GeneralizationsAreBad (talk) 22:51, 6 June 2015 (UTC)
If there's no dispute, shall we take a roll call on this edit? GeneralizationsAreBad (talk) 23:17, 6 June 2015 (UTC)
I've been out of town with very little sleep. I will look at this. Just not right now. I apologize. Timothyjosephwood (talk) 20:44, 7 June 2015 (UTC)
It's totally fine, I think we're all a bit sleep-deprived here. GeneralizationsAreBad (talk) 23:47, 7 June 2015 (UTC)

I don't have any issue with including the units. Not a big deal either way with me. As far as the captions go, I think both are less than ideal. I would prefer to simply state what's in the image, rather than using the image as a platform for talking about something else (see WP:COATRACK). I would prefer something like "South Korean refugees fleeing the village of Ching Chong in 1951 after the area was occupied by British troops." Now, all of that is completely made up and whether we actually have these details is anybody's guess. The current suggestions talks about refugees in general and not this picture in particular. In all fairness, we may or may not have bombed certain parts of the peninsula into the stone age. How do we know they're not running from us?

Also, as a general rule of thumb, if you are going to quote a statistic then you need a source. How do we know it was 100s of thousands of refugees and not millions? Timothyjosephwood (talk) 22:32, 9 June 2015 (UTC)

Here's a source dealing with the refugees: [1]. The scale was huge, regardless of exact numbers. GeneralizationsAreBad (talk) 23:42, 9 June 2015 (UTC)
Again, I agree with you that the captions should be short, descriptive and to the point. Let's not repeat the drama each time we have to caption an image. GeneralizationsAreBad (talk) 23:44, 9 June 2015 (UTC)
Part of this is to illustrate a point about WP guidelines, guidelines that will hopefully become automatic and not have to be discussed again. This is a particularly good illustration. The article Hanley cites actually says 1.8 million refugees in the South and 1 million in the North. This is why we provide citations for statistics. So why not go with something like "the Korean war resulted in an estimated 2.8 million refugees". It provides a larger context for the 380,000 in the text and adds information to the article instead of vaguely rehashing what has already been said. Timothyjosephwood (talk) 00:35, 10 June 2015 (UTC)
I would also like to find a replacement for "reeled" in the last line per WP:EDITORIALIZING. This is an opinion, that their retreat was "reeling". Instead the sentence should include a bare statement of fact like (just making this up), "as UN forces retreated 100 miles over the course of 10 days." This actually adds information for the reader, rather than using colorful language to cover the fact that no actual information is being conveyed. Timothyjosephwood (talk) 01:52, 10 June 2015 (UTC)
That was actually on my mind for a while. Yes, I think it should be changed to "retreated" or "fell back." GeneralizationsAreBad (talk) 11:57, 10 June 2015 (UTC)

Timothyjosephwood, GeneralizationsAreBad, Irondome, Wikimedes: There’s some heavy lifting ahead, and I hope this Background section, which should be noncontroversial, can be dealt with expeditiously. As I’ve said, I suspect you’ll see soon enough that trying to deal with the problems graf by graf will prove untenable. Let me explain in the context of this section.

Originally this section revived and dealt with the subject of infiltration (already established in the Lead as the rationale for shooting civilians) with this:

With large gaps in their front lines and refugees fleeing ahead of the North Korean advance, the Americans were sometimes attacked from behind, and reports spread that disguised North Korean soldiers were infiltrating south with refugee columns, a continuing concern throughout the war's first year.

But then all of this was added:

An official 25th ID war diary describes the refugee predicament they were faced with in the early days of the war: No one desired to shoot innocent people, but many of the innocent-looking refugees dressed in the traditional white clothes of the Koreans turned out to be North Korean soldiers transporting ammunition and heavy weapons in farm wagons and carrying military equipment in packs on their backs. They were observed many times changing from uniforms to civilian clothing and back into uniform. There were so many refugees that it was impossible to screen and search them all.

During the Battle of Taejon later in mid July, hundreds of North Korean soldiers, many dressed in white to disguise themselves as refugees, infiltrated behind the 24th Infantry Division and played a crucial role in the defeat of the 24th at Taejon resulting in the capture of General William Dean the conflict's highest ranking prisoner of war.

On July 24, a man dressed in the traditional white peasant clothing accompanied by a seemingly pregnant woman were searched by members of the 8th Cavalry Regiment and the woman's "pregnancy" proved to be a small radio hidden under her clothes used to report American positions to KPA forces.

… with the KPA driving hundreds of refugees towards US positions to clear minefields.

Two days before the incident at No Gun Ri, a company from the 8th U.S. Cavalry Regiment was reportedly attacked by North Korean irregulars who infiltrated a crowd of refugees west of Yongdong.

These infiltrators also established a roadblock behind the 8th Cavarly’s position, cutting them off from the rest of the American forces, wounding the Battalion’s commanding officer, and attacking rear echelon field artillery units supporting the rescue effort of the trapped 8th Cav soldiers. During the Battle of Chochiwon in early July, 1950, North Korean infiltration teams provided accurate and detailed information on the location and strength of the 21st Infantry's 3rd battalion providing the KPA with the intelligence needed to perform a coordinated assault, quickly routing the 3-21 from its positions.


Much of the overkill above is weakly sourced. And the final two “incidents,” the “roadblock” and Chochiwon in the final graf, are plainly false. The infiltrators were uniformed NK soldiers. The U.S. Army used the term “infiltration” for any enemy penetration behind U.S. lines. The episodes were clearly shown to be false in Talk, by quoting from the cited source, and still there was a flat refusal (Welcome to No Gun Ri Massacre) to remove the bogus incidents. They were later removed by other hands.

Bottom line: The Proposed Edit 6 above, seven grafs, represents a compromise. It even includes one reported episode that’s not supported in the official history.

This is an article about the massacre, not about verified and unverified infiltration reports (or General Dean, or minefields).

I hope we can discuss the section as a whole, deal with it expeditiously, and move on to more challenging sections. Thanks. Cjhanley (talk)

Weakly sourced = not sourced to the AP. Nothing about the battle of Chochiwon is in the article (re you rfering to another article on Wikipedia perhaps?).
You've made this point before about how the "official history" does not mention the KPA disguising its forces as civilians to infiltrate them past the US lines calling it a "particular falsehood" of mine. According to Roy Appleman who wrote what you refer to as the official history of the Korean War

The large numbers of Korean refugees crowding the Yongdong area undoubtedly helped the enemy infiltrate the 1st Cavalry Division positions. On 24 July, for example, a man dressed in white carrying a heavy pack, and accompanied by a woman appearing to be pregnant, came under suspicion. The couple was searched and the woman's assumed pregnancy proved to be a small radio hidden under her clothes. She used this radio for reporting American positions. Eighth Army tried to control the refugee movement through the Korean police, permitting it only during daylight hours and along predetermined routes. - pg 199

Many secondary sources, Bateman among them, have described the North Korean's use of these tactics as a contributing factor to what happened. WeldNeck (talk) 14:19, 10 June 2015 (UTC)
I believe that a mention of fears of infiltration -- if not infiltration itself -- is fine as long as it doesn't become undue. If we can source it well, I think it could reasonably be included. GeneralizationsAreBad (talk) 16:23, 10 June 2015 (UTC)

How about we actually discuss the edit that started this section and not revert back to a previous discussion. We are not proposing whole sections; we are proposing edits. We are not having a broad ideological discussion. Chanley, I appreciate that you hope this section is non-controversial. I appreciate your hope that this can be done expeditiously. Your hope fails you. The entire article is controversial. That's why we're doing this. I'm closing the above discussion up until the point that is was about specific edits and not broad sweeping changes. Timothyjosephwood (talk) 16:40, 10 June 2015 (UTC)

I removed the archive tag above. Such tags are appropriate for halting discussions not aimed at improving the article - but not for halting discussion of improvements you don't like. Rhoark (talk) 17:02, 10 June 2015 (UTC)
I archived the discussion because it is the same type of general debate of "let's delete five paragraphs because I need to WP:RIGHTGREATWRONGS" that has plunged this article into two years of unproductive argument. We have successfully updated the lead and we have done it by discussing specific edits, not wholesale sweeping changes. Timothyjosephwood (talk) 17:19, 10 June 2015 (UTC)
I am simply trying to frame, for all, the problems afflicting the article, as we enter each section. There can't possibly be anything wrong with discussing the article's problems. That's what editors do. And, believe me, this will be no tweaking exercise. The problem with this section is undue weight given to the infiltration matter, with often weak or misused sources. One must look at the section overall to see that, no? If we then insist on going graf by graf, fine, let's give it a try.
Now, is there any need for further discussion of the Proposed Edit6A? Shall we move ahead? Cjhanley (talk) — Preceding undated comment added 17:59, 10 June 2015 (UTC)
The question at hand in the hatted portion did not seem to be any sweeping change, but a foundational question about what reliable sources say about North Korean forces concealing themselves among civilians. If they were doing this, or U.S. forces believed they were doing this, it's part of historical/encyclopedic interest in the etiology of the massacre. Part of the resistance on this point is, I think, borne from a fear that it could provide an exculpatory angle on the actions of U.S. forces, but verifiability is the only concern to which editors should give consideration. Rhoark (talk) 18:35, 10 June 2015 (UTC)
Verifiability, plus Undue Weight, Coatracking and probably a half-dozen other considerations that WP editors more practiced than I could cite. The editor who dumped all of that material into the article -- false, true and in between -- boasted that he would insert every infiltration report he could find into the article. The bad-faith intent was obvious. As noted, it even included two fabricated "incidents." The original was sufficient, simply noting there were such reports and this aroused fear among the troops. But I now propose going beyond that, retaining a couple of the more detailed elements, deleting a couple of questionable ones, and moving on. Speaking of which, again, is there agreement on Proposed Edit6A? Thanks. Cjhanley (talk) — Preceding undated comment added 19:26, 10 June 2015 (UTC)
If we change "reeled in retreat" to "retreated," "fell back," or something similar, then I'm fine with 6A. GeneralizationsAreBad (talk) 19:35, 10 June 2015 (UTC)
Also, it would be good to put a footnote on the image caption. GeneralizationsAreBad (talk) 19:36, 10 June 2015 (UTC)
Sorry, that's a Defense Department photo (the refugees). Do you want to footnote that, or simply add a credit in parens? Also, re total number of refugees, I suggest Conway-Lanz's book as the definitive source; he cites the UN Command counting 5 million South and North Korean refugees as of spring 1951. I'll insert that, with footnote, in the caption. Charles J. Hanley 20:24, 10 June 2015 (UTC) — Preceding unsigned comment added by Cjhanley (talkcontribs)
Sorry for being unclear; I meant a footnote for the caption, "Hundreds of thousands of South Koreans..." GeneralizationsAreBad (talk) 20:33, 10 June 2015 (UTC)
I just revised Proposed edit 6A to specify the numbers of refugees, and to credit the photo. Charles J. Hanley 20:36, 10 June 2015 (UTC)
Great. In case we need even more citations/information, I suggest Tae-Ung Baik's "A War Crime against an Ally's Civilians," pages 461-463: [2] GeneralizationsAreBad (talk) 20:44, 10 June 2015 (UTC)

Reposting 6A at bottom of discussion for clarity's sake

I apologize for my absence. I have quite a lot of life happening at the moment. I will try to keep up. Remember, WP:TIND. Also, encouragingly, I think we may have reached the point where Chanley is starting to spout off WP:SOMETHING like a true babbling editor. Just a little farther and you'll successfully ruin your writing career. Shoot for the moon; if you miss you'll probably go floating irretrievably into interstellar space.

I removed the "huge" sentence from the caption. Same editorializing issue as before. If a sentence doesn't actually convey factual information it should be removed. Surely you've all heard the "think like a Martian scientist" thought experiment. Think about WP:EDITORIALIZING as "think like an idiot robot". This guy is reducing prose down to 1s and 0s and he disregarding anything that sounds nice but doesn't actually increase his understanding of the world.

Background

By spring 1951, the U.S.-led U.N. Command estimated 5 million South and North Koreans had become refugees.[1]: 150–151  (U.S. Defense Department photo)

The division of Japan's former Korean colony into two zones at the end of World War II led to years of border skirmishing between U.S.-allied South Korea and Soviet-allied North Korea. On June 25, 1950, the North Korean army invaded the south to try to reunify the peninsula, touching off a war that would draw in both the U.S. and Chinese militaries and end in a stalemate and armistice three years later.

The immediate U.S. response was to dispatch the 24th Infantry Division, and later the 25th Infantry Division and the 1st Cavalry Division, all part of the occupation forces in Japan, to fight alongside the South Korean army. These American troops were insufficiently trained, poorly equipped and often led by inexperienced officers. In particular, they lacked training in how to deal with war-displaced civilians.[2]: iv–v  In the two weeks after the Americans first arrived on July 5, 1950, the U.S. Army estimated that 380,000 South Korean civilians fled south, passing through U.S. and South Korean lines, as the defending forces retreated.[3]: 251 

References

  1. ^ Conway-Lanz, Sahr (2006). Collateral damage: Americans, noncombatant immunity, and atrocity after World War II. New York: Routledge. ISBN 0-415-97829-7.
  2. ^ Office of the Inspector General, Department of the Army. No Gun Ri Review. Washington, D.C. January 2001
  3. ^ Appleman, Roy E. (1961). South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu (June–November 1950). Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army. Retrieved February 8, 2012.

Proposed edit 6B

I propose changing this…

With large gaps in their front lines and refugees fleeing the onrush of the North Korean advance, the Americans were sometimes attacked from behind, and reports spread that disguised North Korean soldiers were infiltrating south with refugee columns, a continuing concern throughout the war's first year.[1]: v 

A July 24, 1950, entry in the 1st Cavalry Division war diary described the predicament: “No one desired to shoot innocent people, but many of the innocent-looking refugees dressed in the traditional white clothes of the Koreans turned out to be North Korean soldiers”.[2]: 101 

  1. ^ Office of the Inspector General, Department of the Army. No Gun Ri Review. Washington, D.C. January 2001
  2. ^ Conway-Lanz, Sahr (2006). Collateral damage: Americans, noncombatant immunity, and atrocity after World War II. New York: Routledge. ISBN 0-415-97829-7.

And instead using this…

With sometimes miles-wide gaps in their front lines and refugees fleeing the North Korean advance, the Americans were sometimes attacked from behind, and reports spread that disguised North Korean soldiers were infiltrating south with refugee columns.[1]: v [2]: 197 

A July 24, 1950, entry in the 1st Cavalry Division “war diary” described the predicament: “No one desired to shoot innocent people, but many of the innocent-looking refugees dressed in the traditional white clothes of the Koreans turned out to be North Korean soldiers”.[3]: 101 

  1. ^ Office of the Inspector General, Department of the Army. No Gun Ri Review. Washington, D.C. January 2001
  2. ^ Appleman, Roy E. (1961). South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu (June–November 1950). Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army. Retrieved February 8, 2012.
  3. ^ Conway-Lanz, Sahr (2006). Collateral damage: Americans, noncombatant immunity, and atrocity after World War II. New York: Routledge. ISBN 0-415-97829-7.
  • In first graf, this notes the gaps between U.S. units were sometimes miles wide (at least five miles at Yongdong). Also tightens that first graf, trimming to essentials.

Cjhanley (talk)

Can we move along on this? If there are no further comments on 6A and 6B, I will have a 6C. Thanks. Cjhanley (talk)
I think it's a minor tweak; I don't object. GeneralizationsAreBad (talk) 19:50, 16 June 2015 (UTC)

Proposed edit 6C

I propose that we change this:

A July 24, 1950, entry in the 1st Cavalry Division war diary described the predicament: “No one desired to shoot innocent people, but many of the innocent-looking refugees dressed in the traditional white clothes of the Koreans turned out to be North Korean soldiers”.[1]: 101 

During the Battle of Taejon later in mid-July, hundreds of North Korean soldiers, many dressed in white to disguise themselves as refugees, infiltrated behind the lines of the U.S. 24th Infantry Division and played a crucial role in the defeat of the 24th at Taejon. The battle resulted in the capture of Major General William Dean, the conflict's highest-ranking prisoner of war.[2] Two days before the incident at No Gun Ri, a company from the 8th U.S. Cavalry Regiment was reportedly attacked by North Korean irregulars who infiltrated a crowd of refugees west of Yongdong [3] with the KPA driving hundreds of refugees towards US positions to clear minefields.[4] On July 24, a man dressed in the traditional white peasant clothing accompanied by a seemingly pregnant woman were searched by members of the 8th Cavalry Regiment and the woman's "pregnancy" proved to be a small radio hidden under her clothes used to report American positions to KPA forces.[5]: 199 

References

  1. ^ Conway-Lanz, Sahr (2006). Collateral damage: Americans, noncombatant immunity, and atrocity after World War II. New York: Routledge. ISBN 0-415-97829-7.
  2. ^ Bill Sloan. "The Darkest Summer: Pusan and Inchon 1950: The Battles That Saved South Korea--and the Marines--from Extinction". Simon and Schuster, Nov 10, 2009. pg 72
  3. ^ Johnston, Richard J.H. (July 27, 1950). "Guile Big Weapon of North Koreans". The New York Times. p. 1.
  4. ^ Korea Institute of Military History. The Korean War: Volume 1. University of Nebraska Press. 2000
  5. ^ Cite error: The named reference Appleman was invoked but never defined (see the help page).

And instead use this:

A July 24, 1950, entry in the 1st Cavalry Division “war diary” described the predicament: “No one desired to shoot innocent people, but many of the innocent-looking refugees dressed in the traditional white clothes of the Koreans turned out to be North Korean soldiers”.[1]: 101 

The official Army history says that around this time a seemingly pregnant woman refugee was searched by 8th Cavalry Regiment troops and her "pregnancy" proved to be a small radio hidden under her clothes said to have been used to report American positions to enemy forces.[2]: 199 

References

  1. ^ Conway-Lanz, Sahr (2006). Collateral damage: Americans, noncombatant immunity, and atrocity after World War II. New York: Routledge. ISBN 0-415-97829-7.
  2. ^ Appleman, Roy E. (1961). South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu (June–November 1950). Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army. Retrieved February 8, 2012.
  • This point re infiltration was originally made via a fat sentence saying American forces were sometimes attacked from behind, reports spread of infiltrators among refugees, and U.S. troops grew to fear refugees. That sentence supplemented a similar statement in the Lead section. Those were sufficient. But then an unnecessary overload of purported examples was piled on. Two “examples” even proved to be false, others weakly sourced. It’s a case of Undue Weight (plus the bloat of extraneous items, such as Gen. Dean and minefields, which have nothing to do with NGR), remedied here with a compromise that nonetheless retains two of the unnecessary “example” elements. Cjhanley (talk)

Proposed edit 6D

From this:

A July 24, 1950, entry in the 1st Cavalry Division war diary described the predicament: “No one desired to shoot innocent people, but many of the innocent-looking refugees dressed in the traditional white clothes of the Koreans turned out to be North Korean soldiers”.[1]: 101 

During the Battle of Taejon later in mid-July, hundreds of North Korean soldiers, many dressed in white to disguise themselves as refugees, infiltrated behind the lines of the U.S. 24th Infantry Division and played a crucial role in the defeat of the 24th at Taejon and the capture of Major General William Dean, the conflict's highest-ranking prisoner of war.[2] Two days before the incident at No Gun Ri, a company from the 8th U.S. Cavalry Regiment was reportedly attacked by North Korean irregulars who infiltrated a crowd of refugees west of Yongdong [3] with the KPA driving hundreds of refugees towards US positions to clear minefields.[4] On July 24, a man dressed in the traditional white peasant clothing accompanied by a seemingly pregnant woman were searched by members of the 8th Cavalry Regiment and the woman's "pregnancy" proved to be a small radio hidden under her clothes used to report American positions to KPA forces.[5]: 199 

References

  1. ^ Conway-Lanz, Sahr (2006). Collateral damage: Americans, noncombatant immunity, and atrocity after World War II. New York: Routledge. ISBN 0-415-97829-7.
  2. ^ Bill Sloan. "The Darkest Summer: Pusan and Inchon 1950: The Battles That Saved South Korea--and the Marines--from Extinction". Simon and Schuster, Nov 10, 2009. pg 72
  3. ^ Johnston, Richard J.H. (July 27, 1950). "Guile Big Weapon of North Koreans". The New York Times. p. 1.
  4. ^ Korea Institute of Military History. The Korean War: Volume 1. University of Nebraska Press. 2000
  5. ^ Cite error: The named reference Appleman was invoked but never defined (see the help page).

To this:

A July 24, 1950, entry in the 1st Cavalry Division war diary described the predicament: “No one desired to shoot innocent people, but many of the innocent-looking refugees dressed in the traditional white clothes of the Koreans turned out to be North Korean soldiers”.[1]: 101 

During the Battle of Taejon later in mid-July, hundreds of North Korean soldiers, many dressed in white to disguise themselves as refugees, infiltrated behind the lines of the U.S. 24th Infantry Division and played a crucial role in the defeat of the 24th at Taejon and the capture of Major General William Dean, the conflict's highest-ranking prisoner of war.[2] Two days before the incident at No Gun Ri, a company from the 8th U.S. Cavalry Regiment was reportedly attacked by North Korean irregulars who infiltrated a crowd of refugees west of Yongdong [3] with the KPA driving hundreds of refugees towards US positions to clear minefields.[4] In addition to harassment from disguised North Korean forces, the allies also had to contend with South Korean communist guerrillas[5]: 721–724 >. On July 24, a man dressed in the traditional white peasant clothing accompanied by a seemingly pregnant woman were searched by members of the 8th Cavalry Regiment and the woman's "pregnancy" proved to be a small radio hidden under her clothes used to report American positions to KPA forces.[5]: 199 

References

  1. ^ Conway-Lanz, Sahr (2006). Collateral damage: Americans, noncombatant immunity, and atrocity after World War II. New York: Routledge. ISBN 0-415-97829-7.
  2. ^ Bill Sloan. "The Darkest Summer: Pusan and Inchon 1950: The Battles That Saved South Korea--and the Marines--from Extinction". Simon and Schuster, Nov 10, 2009. pg 72
  3. ^ Johnston, Richard J.H. (July 27, 1950). "Guile Big Weapon of North Koreans". The New York Times. p. 1.
  4. ^ Korea Institute of Military History. The Korean War: Volume 1. University of Nebraska Press. 2000
  5. ^ a b Cite error: The named reference Appleman was invoked but never defined (see the help page).

I think this mentions infiltration by KPA forces as well as South Korean Communists using guerrilla tactics to strike behind allied lines. WeldNeck (talk) 20:30, 17 June 2015 (UTC)

Please, your "Proposed Edit 6D" is simply a revert to the overloaded, "Undue Weight" passage that we're to discuss reducing to something reasonable and well-sourced. If you want to defend what now exists, including the overkill and the weak sources, let's hear it. But don't confuse things. For example, why do we need a bloated half-dozen elements/"examples", half of them weakly sourced, when a simple statement will do saying there were attacks from the rear, reports of infiltration, and fear among the U.S. troops? Why isn't that sufficient? Cjhanley (talk) — Preceding undated comment added 21:00, 17 June 2015 (UTC)
Is the part about South Korean Communists also attributed to the footnote that follows? If not, then I would recommend sourcing it. GeneralizationsAreBad (talk) 21:30, 17 June 2015 (UTC)
Added a footnote on this. WeldNeck (talk) 15:42, 18 June 2015 (UTC)

This is getting difficult to follow when I'm not able to be on here for hours a day.

I'm going to say I think I disagree with both the suggestions. As a general rule, if you are going to list things, you need to be sourcing that list in a list of things. For example, if I wanted to make a section called "famous flanking maneuvers" in an article on mechanized warfare, it's not enough that I have lots of books on my shelves that deal with mechanized flanking. What I need is one single book called "the most flipping famous flanking maneuvers in mechanized warfare history".

Further, when I make that section I need to say "Victor Freckle in his book, The Most Flipping Famous Flanking Maneuvers in Mechanized Warfare History, listed the following examples as the most prominent: 1. That time Hannibal used jeeps and light tanks to encircle the Romans, 2. That time Patton decided enough shit hadn't been blown up that day..."

What I can't do is say "dude, I know a lot about mechanized flanking, and I have way too many books on it. I should take this stuff I know and compile it together in a WP section because I'm an expert." That is literally the definition of WP:SYNTH.

Further, per WP:UNDUE, the article isn't about asymmetrical warfare during the Korean war. The correct course of action here is to actually make an article on that topic and link to it from this one. That way if the reader wants to know more, they have the opportunity. At the same time the reader isn't saying "I thought I was reading an article on a bunch of civilians being killed. How come I'm reading so much generic stuff on the Korean War? Where's the part where lots of people stop being alive?" Timothyjosephwood (talk) 18:38, 18 June 2015 (UTC)

The asymmetrical aspect of this war is cited by historians like BAteman and the US Army as significant contributing factors and its only three sentences.The entire reason there is a background section is to provide some detail as to the environment these events took place in so as to not have it come from a vacuum. WeldNeck (talk) 19:20, 18 June 2015 (UTC)
There is no vacuum. There is the Korean War. That's why it's linked to in the first sentence.
Come to think of it, why do we even have a background section? Is there really anything in there that can't be otherwise covered by Korean war? Half of it is a primer on the war; the other half is a primer on war. On the one hand, why do I need to know who the first unit deployed was? If I wanted to know that wouldn't I just look at the main article on the war? Oh look, Ctrl-F, they have eight paragraphs on the initial US response. On the other hand, of course there were combatants posing as civilians. This is modern warfare. Name a post WWII conflict that didn't have combatants posing as civilians. There are only two types of war left: types that destroy all life on earth, and asymmetrical warfare.
Just trying to find a radical solution, but couldn't we just delete the whole damn thing and be done with it? Timothyjosephwood (talk) 19:31, 18 June 2015 (UTC)
It seems to me that the better option is to make an entry on Asymmetric warfare about Korea, link to Korean war, and link to the section on Asymmetric warfare. It provides the information, but it avoids spending the first half dozen paragraphs of the article talking about stuff the article isn't about. Timothyjosephwood (talk) 19:38, 18 June 2015 (UTC)
By my reading of WP:ORNOT, creating a list of things is not original research. It does not automatically imply the list is complete or formed of the most important instances of items that belong in the list. If those claims are made explicitly, it would of course need sourcing. To my knowledge there is not a policy that would support an absolute prescription on whether to provide examples of infiltration or only say that there were examples (assuming either statement is well-sourced.) Rhoark (talk) 20:46, 18 June 2015 (UTC)
May I humbly suggest, first of all, that we stick to a process here and go section by section. In other words, I strongly recommend we not deal with that "Events of 25-30 July" section, with its needless miasma of TACPs and mission reports, until we clear up this Background section. Can we agree on that?
Secondly, I also strongly recommend that we retain a Background section. It should be tight, but it should tell the reader the basics, like who's fighting whom. (We can't expect the reader to link and read the entire Korean War article.) And it need mention the fear of infiltration via refugees, and briefly, again, that orders were being issued to shoot civilians.
Third, TJWood is precisely correct: This is not an article about refugee infiltration in the Korean War. All that is needed is a statement that reports of such infiltration spread through the war front, arousing fears of refugees on the U.S. side. That's attributable to any of a number of books.
Timothyjosephwood, you haven't missed anything, by the way. This is the first quasi-meaty section dealt with. Please see Proposed edit 6C, and not 6D, which is simply a repeat of what's there now, expanded to add another superfluous wrinkle. 6C has both what's there and what's proposed, and actually includes two infiltration examples/elements, as a compromise. As said, I don't think any are needed, but if two examples as a sop will move us along, I'm fine with that.
Also, you're right, we needn't ID the divisions first ashore that way. That was first done by another well-meaning editor, and his naming the 24th then required naming the other two. All can go.
But, please, let's stick with section by section, because otherwise even I, the expert ... oh, sorry... I, NOBODY SPECIAL, will be confused. Thanks. Cjhanley (talk)
Are there any further comments on Proposed edit 6C (not 6D, but 6C)? Timothyjosephwood, how strongly do you favor excising all the "asymmetrical warfare" examples? I also feel none are warranted but, as I've said, I don't think leaving in a couple of lines slows the article too much and can be accepted. Cjhanley (talk)
All apologies to Weld and NOBODY SPECIAL, but I do think the whole section should be deleted. I know very little about the Korean War (KW) (read I know a good deal more than the average English speaker. My wife didn't even know what decade it was in or who the belligerents were, and she works with KW veterans.) It's enough to say that it happened during the Korean War and point readers to other articles. The whole section is a WP:COATRACK. There are other articles that cover the same information better.
It's a much better option to improve the Asymmetric warfare article and the Korean War article. Asym warfare really should have a section on Korea. (I'm really surprised it doesn't.) Korean War could really use improvements on the war crimes section. It links to this article, and this article should cover the "war crime", not the KW. (I use quotations because only losers see the Hague.)
On a side note, I think both sides need a healthy appreciation for the terrible things that the US has done. We committed unapologetic genocide in at least the Indian Wars, the Spanish American War and WWII. A few hundred dead civilians aspires to be a footnote in history. Timothyjosephwood (talk) 14:57, 20 June 2015 (UTC)
"On 1 September 1939, Germany invaded Poland." So begins the 1,000-word "Background" section in the Katyn massacre article. Boston Massacre has a 700-word “Background” section, and Wounded Knee Massacre a 700-word “Prelude” section, all dealing with events preceding and setting the stage for the article’s main subject. My Lai Massacre, whose structure, I believe, was a model of sorts for this article, has an 800-plus-word “Background” section. Obviously, I still strongly feel such a section is needed – done tightly. We can take out, for example, the line about how the Korean War ended. But plunging directly into the “Events of 25-29 July” will leave us scrambling to explain many things while describing the killings.
As for the few hundred dead, the overarching historical importance of NGR is that it was the first such mass killing to come to light internationally, and it was followed by revelations of a vast landscape of blanket orders to indiscriminately shoot civilians and of wholesale killings, particularly from the air. Total casualties in Korea will never be known - 2 million? 3 million? more? -- but it is known that most of the dead were civilians, and a great percentage of those died at U.S. hands. Cjhanley (talk) — Preceding undated comment added 17:12, 20 June 2015 (UTC)
WP:COATRACK may be a bit too harsh. I think some background is indeed necessary, and we can trim it as needed. GeneralizationsAreBad (talk) 18:38, 20 June 2015 (UTC)
Here, at User:Cjhanley/Tightened 'Background' section, is how the Background section can be trimmed to 261 words, from 550, retaining just the essentials. Charles J. Hanley 19:04, 20 June 2015 (UTC)
Timothyjosephwood, GeneralizationsAreBad, Irondome, I've been tied up for a couple of days, but can we move ahead and deal with this relatively simple matter of the Background section? I propose two options: Proposed edit 6C (which would be followed by a final graf or two setting up the No Gun Ri scene), or the much-reduced two-graf Background section proposed at User:Cjhanley/Tightened 'Background' section, bowing to the feeling that the section was much overdone. Cjhanley (talk)


Proposed edit 6E

From this:

A July 24, 1950, entry in the 1st Cavalry Division war diary described the predicament: “No one desired to shoot innocent people, but many of the innocent-looking refugees dressed in the traditional white clothes of the Koreans turned out to be North Korean soldiers”.[1]: 101 

During the Battle of Taejon later in mid-July, hundreds of North Korean soldiers, many dressed in white to disguise themselves as refugees, infiltrated behind the lines of the U.S. 24th Infantry Division and played a crucial role in the defeat of the 24th at Taejon and the capture of Major General William Dean, the conflict's highest-ranking prisoner of war.[2] Two days before the incident at No Gun Ri, a company from the 8th U.S. Cavalry Regiment was reportedly attacked by North Korean irregulars who infiltrated a crowd of refugees west of Yongdong [3] with the KPA driving hundreds of refugees towards US positions to clear minefields.[4] On July 24, a man dressed in the traditional white peasant clothing accompanied by a seemingly pregnant woman were searched by members of the 8th Cavalry Regiment and the woman's "pregnancy" proved to be a small radio hidden under her clothes used to report American positions to KPA forces.[5]: 199 

References

  1. ^ Conway-Lanz, Sahr (2006). Collateral damage: Americans, noncombatant immunity, and atrocity after World War II. New York: Routledge. ISBN 0-415-97829-7.
  2. ^ Bill Sloan. "The Darkest Summer: Pusan and Inchon 1950: The Battles That Saved South Korea--and the Marines--from Extinction". Simon and Schuster, Nov 10, 2009. pg 72
  3. ^ Johnston, Richard J.H. (July 27, 1950). "Guile Big Weapon of North Koreans". The New York Times. p. 1.
  4. ^ Korea Institute of Military History. The Korean War: Volume 1. University of Nebraska Press. 2000
  5. ^ Cite error: The named reference Appleman was invoked but never defined (see the help page).

To this:

During the Battle of Taejon later in mid-July, hundreds of North Korean soldiers, many dressed in white to disguise themselves as refugees, infiltrated behind the lines of the U.S. 24th Infantry Division and played a crucial role in the defeat of the 24th at Taejon and the capture of Major General William Dean, the conflict's highest-ranking prisoner of war.[1] Two days before the incident at No Gun Ri, a company from the 8th U.S. Cavalry Regiment was reportedly attacked by North Korean irregulars who infiltrated a crowd of refugees west of Yongdong [2] with the KPA driving hundreds of refugees towards US positions to clear minefields.[3] In addition to harassment from disguised North Korean forces, the allies also had to contend with South Korean communist guerrillas[4]: 721–724 >. On July 24, a man dressed in the traditional white peasant clothing accompanied by a seemingly pregnant woman were searched by members of the 8th Cavalry Regiment and the woman's "pregnancy" proved to be a small radio hidden under her clothes used to report American positions to KPA forces.[4]: 199 

References

  1. ^ Bill Sloan. "The Darkest Summer: Pusan and Inchon 1950: The Battles That Saved South Korea--and the Marines--from Extinction". Simon and Schuster, Nov 10, 2009. pg 72
  2. ^ Johnston, Richard J.H. (July 27, 1950). "Guile Big Weapon of North Koreans". The New York Times. p. 1.
  3. ^ Korea Institute of Military History. The Korean War: Volume 1. University of Nebraska Press. 2000
  4. ^ a b Cite error: The named reference Appleman was invoked but never defined (see the help page).

Removal of the first paragraph doesnt take anything away from the background and leaves only verified facts describing both Nork infiltration of refugees and South Korean guerrillas. WeldNeck (talk) 17:50, 24 June 2015 (UTC)

Ping

@Iryna Harpy: As requested. GeneralizationsAreBad (talk) 01:15, 4 July 2015 (UTC)

Cheers, GeneralizationsAreBad. I'm still mulling over how this article and the potential issue of WP:OWNership should be addressed. At the the moment, my inclination is to take it to the WP:DRN. It strikes me as being an article that has flown under the radar for a few years without third party input. Please let me know whether you consider it to be an issue to be evaluated between the two prominent parties involved involved with its evolution in collaboration with an overseeing, experienced mediator, or whether it is an issue to be brought up at the WP:ANI. --Iryna Harpy (talk) 01:26, 4 July 2015 (UTC)
Iryna Harpy, as GeneralizationsAreBad knows, the feeling here is that the involvement of a handful of sensible, experienced new editors, observing, commenting and revising as the article's problems are pointed out and edits are proposed, should help restore No Gun Ri Massacre in short order to something coherent, readable and accurate. Real progress was made from late May into mid-June (with the Lead section revised), but things then ground to a near-halt as the interest of some seemed to wane. I would urge Timothyjosephwood, Irondome, and Wikimedes, as well as ErrantX, to return now to this work in progress. But I strongly suggest it not be tinkered with paragraph by paragraph, dragging things out needlessly (as in mid-June), but addressed section by section, with a proposed edit for an entire section, with clear explanations and an invitation to discussion and revision.
Iryna Harpy, I hope you can help. After you read the article, I urge you to read the very concise summary of issues at User:Cjhanley/No Gun Ri Massacre: The Problems. Thanks. Charles J. Hanley 21:30, 6 July 2015 (UTC)

To move ahead on Background section

Here is what I hope is a final proposed overall edit for dealing with the Background section, largely consisting of a consolidation of previous ideas presented in snippets:

Background

Huge numbers of South Koreans fled south in mid-1950 after the North Korean army invaded. By spring 1951, the U.S.-led U.N. Command estimated 5 million South and North Koreans had become refugees.”.[1]: 150–151  (U.S. Defense Department photo)

On June 25, 1950, the communist-led North Korean army invaded South Korea to try to reunify the peninsula, a former Japanese colony divided at the end of World War II. The United States quickly dispatched troops from its occupation forces in Japan to fight alongside the South Korean army. These American troops were insufficiently trained, poorly equipped and often led by inexperienced officers. In particular, they lacked training in how to deal with war-displaced civilians.[2]: iv–v  Over two weeks in mid-July, the U.S. Army estimated 380,000 South Korean civilians fled south, passing through U.S. and South Korean lines, as the defending forces retreated.[3]: 251 

With miles-wide gaps in their front lines, the Americans were sometimes attacked from behind, and reports spread that disguised North

North Korean snipers dressed in the white garments common among refugee groups being searched and interrogated by American and South Korean troops in early August of 1950.[2]: v [nb 5]

Korean soldiers were infiltrating south with refugee columns[2]: v  A July 24, 1950, entry in the 1st Cavalry Division “war diary” claimed “many of the innocent-looking refugees dressed in the traditional white clothes of the Koreans turned out to be North Korean soldiers”.[1]: 101  A newspaper report that same week said the division’s 8th Cavalry Regiment troops were attacked by North Korean irregulars who infiltrated a refugee crowd west of the central South Korean town of Yongdong, 100 miles (160 km) south of Seoul.[4] At the same time, however, a U.S. Army intelligence report said no infiltrators were found when almost all southbound refugees were searched over one 24-hour period, and a Pentagon observer team at the war front referred to reports of civilian-clad infiltrators as “unconfirmed,” saying instead “strong flanking elements” of uniformed North Korean troops were penetrating huge gaps in the U.S. lines.[5]

Research in declassified archives decades later found orders issued during this period to fire on Korean civilians.[6] On July 26, 1950, Maj. Gen. Hobart R. Gay, 1st Cavalry Division commander, told rear-echelon reporters he suspected most refugees on the road were disguised enemy. [7] It was on that day that one of Gay's front-line units, the 2nd Battalion, 7th Cavalry Regiment,[nb 6] dug in near the village of No Gun Ri, was faced with an approaching throng of hundreds of refugees, most from the nearby villages of Chu Gok Ri and Im Ke Ri.

References

  1. ^ a b Conway-Lanz, Sahr (2006). Collateral damage: Americans, noncombatant immunity, and atrocity after World War II. New York: Routledge. ISBN 0-415-97829-7.
  2. ^ a b c Office of the Inspector General, Department of the Army. No Gun Ri Review. Washington, D.C. January 2001
  3. ^ Appleman, Roy E. (1961). South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu (June–November 1950). Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army. Retrieved February 8, 2012.
  4. ^ Johnston, Richard J.H. (1950-07-27). "Guile Big Weapon of North Koreans". The New York Times. p. 1,3 (This report is not corroborated in the official Army history).
  5. ^ Eighth U.S. Army, July 23, 1950, Interrogation report, "North Korean methods of operation," Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2; and Office of the Chief of Army Field Forces, “Report of first OCAFF observer team to the Far East Command,” August 16, 1950. Cited in Hanley, Charles J. (2012). "No Gun Ri: Official Narrative and Inconvenient Truths". Truth and Reconciliation in South Korea: Between the Present and Future of the Korean Wars. London and New York: Routledge. pp. 74 and 79. ISBN 978-0-415-62241-7. {{cite book}}: Unknown parameter |editors= ignored (|editor= suggested) (help)
  6. ^ Cumings, Bruce (December 2001). "Occurrence at Nogun-ri Bridge". Critical Asian Studies. 33 (4): 512. ISSN 1467-2715.
  7. ^ The Associated Press, American and British Task Force Supports Yank Retreat July 26, 1950.


This accomplishes what we have discussed previously: trimming the Background section, from 553 words to 370 words. I think we almost all agreed that the "infiltration" material was terribly overdone (not to mention weakly sourced in half the cases). And Timothyjosephwood felt strongly there was more wordage on the Korean War itself than needed.

One new element is added: The “Pentagon observer team” in the second paragraph. Also, the quick reference to orders to fire on civilians (3rd paragraph) is not in Background in the current article, but it seemed necessary to repeat this point from the Lead section in order to set up what follows.

GeneralizationsAreBad, Timothyjosephwood, Irondome, Wikimedes, Iryna Harpy, comments and suggestions, please. Thanks. Cjhanley (talk)

We need to stay with the established process. Your proposed text is far too large to evaluate. WeldNeck (talk) 22:03, 9 July 2015 (UTC)

We've been through proposed edits 6A, 6B and 6C. This now wraps it all up. We need to move on. Charles J. Hanley 22:26, 9 July 2015 (UTC) — Preceding unsigned comment added by Cjhanley (talkcontribs)
but we did not go through 6D or 6E and we never reached consensus on A-C. WeldNeck (talk) 02:38, 10 July 2015 (UTC)
Those other propositions didn't lead to much discussion when they were proposed. No agreement was reached, either to include or exclude them. GAB (talk) 02:50, 10 July 2015 (UTC)

Sorry I've been out for so long. I recently noticed the following sentence:

Although established international laws of war, such as the 1907 Hague Convention, held belligerents responsible for the conduct of their subordinates,[1] Clinton later told reporters, "The evidence was not clear that there was responsibility for wrongdoing high enough in the chain of command in the Army to say that, in effect, the government was responsible."[2]

  1. ^ Hague Convention. 1907 Article 3. The Hague, Netherlands. Retrieved February 14, 2012
  2. ^ "No Gun Ri: Unanswered". Associated Press. January 13, 2001.

It's pretty obviously WP:SYNTH. Unless the AP source cited actually states the first part of the sentence, or unless we can find another source explicitly mentioning the Hague Convention, I think we'd be better off removing it altogether. GeneralizationsAreBad (talk) 22:09, 28 June 2015 (UTC)

Beyond synth, it's not Wikipedia's place to render a legal judgement. The President's statement appears notable since it represents the official US Government opinion (even though it is apparently inaccurate). Criticisms of the statement should be attributed rather than presented in Wikipedia's voice.--Wikimedes (talk) 06:58, 29 June 2015 (UTC)
Just added a source re the Hague Convention's statement on responsibility, i.e., in addition to the convention itself, already cited. There's yet another source, the Baik article in the Notre Dame law journal, that cites Hague in establishing No Gun Ri as a war crime. But the point made in the above paragraph is a narrower one. I believe GAB intends to work up a "legal" section for this article that would sort all this out. Cjhanley (talk) — Preceding undated comment added 13:06, 29 June 2015 (UTC)
Thanks for adding the CAS article. I was indeed considering stripping out the legal elements from other paragraphs and putting them into another paragraph, which might be helpful. GeneralizationsAreBad (talk) 14:15, 29 June 2015 (UTC)
On second thought, I'm not sure if adding a legal paragraph is a good idea. Wikimedes does have a point. GeneralizationsAreBad (talk) 21:05, 29 June 2015 (UTC)

Perhaps this is a better wording?:

On the day the US Army No Gun RI Report came out, then-President Bill Clinton issued a statement declaring, "I deeply regret that Korean civilians lost their lives at No Gun Ri in late July, 1950", but did not acknowledge wrongdoing on the part of the US Army.[1][nb 7] On [date], Clinton told reporters "The evidence was not clear that there was responsibility for wrongdoing high enough in the chain of command in the Army to say that, in effect, the government was responsible."[2] Referring to Clinton’s [date] statement in a 2010 Critical Asian Studies article, AP reporter Charles J. Hanley stated that according to the rules of war agreed to in the 1907 Hague Convention, belligerents are responsible for the conduct of their subordinates.[3]: 594  [nb 8]

References
  1. ^ BBC News (January 11, 2001). "US 'deeply regrets' civilian killings". BBC News Online. Retrieved 2007-04-15.
  2. ^ "No Gun Ri: Unanswered". Associated Press. January 13, 2001.
  3. ^ Hanley, Charles (15 November 2010). "NO GUN RI: Official Narrative and Inconvenient Truths". Critical Asian Studies. 42 (4). doi:10.1080/14672715.2010.515389. Retrieved 2 June 2015.
Notes
  1. ^ National Archives-Still Pictures Branch, Record Group 111, Entry 111-SC Signal Corps Photographs of American Military Activity 1900-1981, Box 187, Photograph SC 346059.
  2. ^ The 2nd Battalion's unit structure was E, F, G, and H Companies; 2nd Battalion; 7th Cavalry Regiment; 1st Cavalry Division; 8th Army
  3. ^ National Archives-Still Pictures Branch, Record Group 111, Entry 111-SC Signal Corps Photographs of American Military Activity 1900-1981, Box 187, Photograph SC 346059.
  4. ^ The 2nd Battalion, one of two battalions in the 7th Cavalry Regiment, 1st Cavalry Division, Eighth U.S. Army, consisted of E, F, G, and H Companies
  5. ^ National Archives-Still Pictures Branch, Record Group 111, Entry 111-SC Signal Corps Photographs of American Military Activity 1900-1981, Box 187, Photograph SC 346059.
  6. ^ The 2nd Battalion's unit structure was E, F, G, and H Companies; 2nd Battalion; 7th Cavalry Regiment; 1st Cavalry Division; 8th Army
  7. ^ Clinton, William J. 2001. Statement on the Korean War incident at No Gun Ri Washington, D.C.: Presidential Papers, Administration of William J. Clinton. 11 January. Retrieved January 14, 2012
  8. ^ Hague Convention. 1907 Article 3. The Hague, Netherlands. Retrieved February 14, 2012
  • The 3 sentences dealing with Clinton’s statements should probably form a separate paragraph.
  • The date of Clinton’s second statement needs to be added.
  • The last sentence is an example of attributing the legal opinion rather than writing it in Wikipedia’s voice. Is the this sentence supported by the source? – I do not have access to the source to check.
  • The links to The Hague Convention text and to Clinton’s statement are in the notes so that primary sources for further reading are separated from secondary sources used to support the article.
  • From its Wikipedia article, Critical Asian Studies did not appear to be a reliable source back when it was called Committee of Concerned Asian Scholars. Has it improved since then?--Wikimedes (talk) 11:26, 7 July 2015 (UTC)
CAS is cited as a source dozens of times across WP. In the end, rather than cite one individual by name to support what should be a self-evident truism, that a sovereign nation is responsible for the actions of its troops, probably all that is needed is a consolidated legal section that includes the lawyers' quote already in the article: "American lawyers for the survivors said that whether the 7th Cavalry troops acted under formal orders or not, 'the massacre of civilian refugees, mainly the elderly, women and children, was in and of itself a clear violation of international law for which the United States is liable under the doctrine of command responsibility and must pay compensation' ". Charles J. Hanley 13:02, 7 July 2015 (UTC) — Preceding unsigned comment added by Cjhanley (talkcontribs)
In that case, is the third sentence needed? It looks like every subsequent paragraph in the section (except the one on the offer of compensation and a memorial) covers 'orders to shoot', and the final paragraph contains the lawyers' statement that whether or not orders were given, command responsibility still exists (and links to command responsibility, which covers the concept in more detail).--Wikimedes (talk) 14:08, 7 July 2015 (UTC)

Yes, agreed, the third sentence is probably unnecessary. But the essential problem, in my view, is that the "legal" elements are too scattered throughout the current article and ought to be consolidated, if not under their own heading, at least as a unit at the end of the "U.S. and South Korean military investigations" section.

That's a complex chore. For one thing, newfound source material, such as the Baik article in the Notre Dame law journal, which concludes NGR is a war crime under the Hague Convention, ought to be incorporated. I would appeal again that we stick to a section-by-section approach to fixing this article, from the top. Every major section has severe problems, and zeroing in on snippets here and there will delay and complicate the major tasks, in my opinion. I would urge that we defer dealing with this section until we've dealt with "Background," "Events" and earlier sections of "Aftermath." Charles J. Hanley 21:42, 7 July 2015 (UTC) — Preceding unsigned comment added by Cjhanley (talkcontribs)

I'd recommend removing the reference to CAS altogether, since it's probably unnecessary. As for CAS itself, its aims are as follows (according to its website):
  • to develop a humane and knowledgeable understanding of Asian societies and their efforts to maintain cultural integrity and to confront such problems as poverty, oppression, and imperialism
  • to create alternatives to the prevailing trends in scholarship on Asia, which too often spring from a parochial cultural perspective and serve selfish interests and expansionism
  • In this spirit Critical Asian Studies welcomes submissions that challenge the accepted formulas for understanding the Asia and Pacific regions, the world, and ourselves.
In any event, the revision looks good. GAB (talk) 00:49, 8 July 2015 (UTC)
I made the change.
Consolidating all the legal opinions (Baik's, Clinton's, survivors' lawyers', the US Army's, etc.) could work. When this was in the article previously [3], it looked like advocacy, so some care needs to be taken to present the information neutrally. Also, be careful of original research.--Wikimedes (talk) 05:09, 11 July 2015 (UTC)

The "D-word"

We seem to have two different spellings of Edward Dailey's (or Daily's) last name in the text. I've seen multiple different spellings... which is correct? GAB (talk) 13:48, 11 July 2015 (UTC)

Never mind, I've dealt with it. GAB (talk) 14:22, 13 July 2015 (UTC)

Cease-fire

Just for the record: copyediting and/or sourcing things properly is perfectly fine (and encouraged) as per our earlier agreement, but let's continue to propose and discuss substantial content changes.

(Also: while journalists can access the North Korean article mentioned, most people probably can't, so that's why I added the additional source.) GAB (talk) 20:02, 29 July 2015 (UTC)

Agreed. And there are proposed content changes on the table, at Talk:No Gun Ri Massacre#To move ahead on Background section. They await discussion. Timothyjosephwood, GeneralizationsAreBad, Irondome, Wikimedes? Iryna Harpy? Or are you content to leave the article in the incoherent, truth-challenged state that it’s in?
Also agreed on adding a second source on that 1950 North Korean news report, although it needn’t be that one. Korean sources also have copies of the original article. Charles J. Hanley 20:59, 29 July 2015 (UTC)
My apologies for the flap earlier. I would have no problem adding the material, provided we brought it up here. GAB (talk) 13:59, 30 July 2015 (UTC)